Media Products as Law: The Mass Media as Enforcers and Sources of Law in China by Lee, Tahirih V.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 39 
Number 3 Summer Article 6 
April 2020 
Media Products as Law: The Mass Media as Enforcers and 
Sources of Law in China 
Tahirih V. Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Tahirih V. Lee, Media Products as Law: The Mass Media as Enforcers and Sources of Law in China, 39 
Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 437 (2011). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
MEDIA PRODUCTS AS LAW:
THE MASS MEDIA AS ENFORCERS AND SOURCES OF LAW IN
CHINA*
TAHIRIH V. LEE**
INTRODUCTION
Government propaganda so permeates Chinese society, it is impossible to
escape its reach. Given this fact, the relationship between law and propaganda is
an important subject for study. To my knowledge, it has not been studied before
now, except in my previous examination of the relationship between the media and
China's legal bureaucracy. In that study, I found that the legal bureaucracy is
closely aligned with the state-run media, and that the commercialization of the last
two decades of the twentieth century did not loosen this connection, at least with
respect to laws that fall into a realm labeled "political."' In this study, I probe
more deeply the problem of how closely bound propaganda and law are in China.
"In the People's Republic of China ("PRC"), the texts of major national
statutes (falu) and regulations (guiding) are published in the primary Chinese
Communist Party newspaper, The People's Daily (Renmin ribao)."2 Clearly these
publications are "law" in the sense that they are officially enacted as laws, but
what about other media transmissions? Print and broadcast media operated by the
state also contain reports of official interpretations of the law, and reports about the
implementation of law and about matters that are regulated by PRC law. Can these
media transmissions also be considered law?
This study attempts to determine whether and how the print and television
media in the PRC function as law. In Part I, I survey law and media in the PRC to
determine whether, as a historical and institutional matter, products of PRC media
might be considered part of China's "legal system" or "sources of law." It is not
difficult to make the case that state-run media are part of the legal system of China,
particularly when the current apparatus is placed in historical context. It is more of
a stretch, however, to argue that media transmissions are authoritative sources of
law. Courts in China do not cite them in published opinions, nor do China's legal
" The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of
this article's Chinese language sources, with regard to citations, references, and translation.
. . Visiting Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. All translations of Chinese
texts, unless otherwise noted, are my own.
1. See Tahirih V. Lee, The Media and the Legal Bureaucracy of the People's Republic of China,
in POWER, MONEY, AND MEDIA: COMMUNICATION PATTERNS AND BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL IN
CULTURAL CHINA 208, 211 (Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 2000).
2. Id. at 208.
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experts view them as authoritative in a formal sense. When Chinese law is viewed
in its historical and social context, however, it becomes clear that media
transmissions about law carry a great deal of authoritative weight. Mass media in
China have been disseminating central policy since the Ming Dynasty.3
Though no one else has published the argument that connects media to law in
this way, the theories of several sociologists provide support for the general notion
that law achieves its power by the way that it is communicated in society to
individuals. Emile Durkheim, Michel Foucault, Edward Epstein, and Carole
Nagengast define the phenomenon of law as something that is broadcast to shape
behavior.4 This view helps to situate law within Chinese society and makes it
easier for us to understand the authoritativeness of any type of official
communication about law in China.
I use a case study to examine the hypothesis-that the mass media in China
both enforce the law and provide authoritative sources of law-produced by this
historical and theoretical survey of the legal role of the media in the PRC. The
study is comprised of a discursive analysis of transmissions of the state-run news
agency Xinhua, two major legal newspapers ran by branches of the Ministry of
Justice, and other official materials. Two samples of transmissions are used, each
of which include popular and internal Party treatises, all of which touch on the
regulation of procreation, marriage, divorce, and care of the elderly. Drawn
randomly from several of the newspapers with the widest circulation in China, one
sample was collected from 1984, and the other sample was collected from 1995
through the first half of 1996. Excluded are the exclusively electronic
transmissions by the government that have become a part of its communication
with the people of China, such as descriptions of events that appear unsolicited on
cell phones. Although such transmissions use different means other than print
media, their message and goal remain the same.5
The media transmissions in the second sample differed from the first sample
in primarily one way. The references and language pointed to concerns of a more
commercial or materialistic nature. Yet, the purpose of the transmissions did not
appear to change from the period of the first sample to the second, eleven to twelve
years later, suggesting that the role of media as a source of law in China is
enduring and strong.
3. See EDWARD L. FARMER, ZHU YUANZHANG AND EARLY MING LEGISLATION: THE
REORDERING OF CHINESE SOCIETY FOLLOWING THE ERA OF MONGOL RULE 9-17 (1995).
4. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 33 (1984); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 8-10 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.
1995) (1977); Edward J. Epstein, Instrumental and Ideological Forms of Law: Implications for China's
Transplant ofHong Kong Law, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 211, 214
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1997); Carole Nagengast, Violence, Terror, and the Crisis of the State, 23 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 109, 116 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Beying Uses New Means in its Efforts to Spin Stoiy, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 8, 2009 at 5.
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In both samples, the media transmissions interpreted and amplified the
relevant law in ways that signaled the mid-1990s tight control of the PRC central
government over "political" matters, and a new sharing of control over "economic"
matters by both the PRC central government and local entities officially
recognized by the government. This pattern remained consistent through the
changes in format of the media transmissions heralded by the commercialization of
the mass media by 1995 and 1996.6
Whether the relationship between media and law in the PRC is unique is
beyond the scope of this paper. Although media in Russia and Taiwan may play a
similar function, detailed evidence of this awaits future research . In the following
section I draw some basic distinctions between the United States and the PRC in
this regard, but in doing so, do not rule out the legal significance of American film
and televised broadcasts of trials and other media transmissions related to law.
I. LAW AND THE PRC STATE-RUN MEDIA
When looking for law, it helps to know what to look for. In the fields of
comparative law and legal history in the United States and Europe, scholars
routinely struggle with this problem. Two fruits of their efforts are the concept of
law as a "legal system," and the concept of "sources of law."
A. Law as Legal System
The concept of "legal system" is probably a product of a passion for systems
that took root in German Neo-Scholasticism in the sixteenth century, was revived
by German proponents of natural law in the eighteenth century, and dominated the
efforts of German jurists through the nineteenth century.8 It is so ingrained in both
the American and the Chinese way of thinking, that in the latter part of the
twentieth century, lawyers and scholars of law do not bother to define it.9 The
6. See infra Part II.
7. To my knowledge, no other studies are devoted to analyzing this question. A few scholars
have studied the role of the media and technology in transitions toward democracy or market economies
in places other than the PRC. Frances H. Foster's groundbreaking work on post-Soviet Russia, in
which she examines the role that its press plays in the emergence of democracy there, and Daniel Katzel
Berman's study of a similar development in Taiwan, are the preeminent examples. See Frances H.
Foster, Freedom With Problems: The Russian Judicial Chamber on Mass Media, 3 PARKER SCH. J. E.
EUR L. 141, 146 (1996); Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Reform: Press, Law,
and Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675 (1993); DANIEL KATZEL BERMAN,
WORDS LIKE COLORED GLASS: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 82
(1992); Thomas Heller, World Trends, STANFORD LAWYER 13 (1990).
8. JAMES Q.WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA:
HISTORICAL VISION AND LEGAL CHANGE 37, 48-49, 80 (1990).
9. See, e.g., Barry Weisberg, Cure for A System In Chaos, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 19, 1992 at 13
(decrying "[tihe chaos of our legal system" in a journalistic fashion, but not defining "legal systems" as
such); see generally, e.g., Jan-Reinard Sieckmann, Legal System and Practical Reason: On the
Structure of a Normative Theory of Law, 5 RATIO JURIS 288 (1992) (providing a more erudite example
without defining the concept of a "legal system"); Jose Juan Moreso and Pablo Eugenio Navarro, Some
Remarks on the Notions of Legal Order and Legal System, 6 RATIO JURIS 48, 49 (1993) (purporting to
"clarifly] the systemic nature of law," but not defining the term "legal system"); but see Thomas D.
2011
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term connotes a sense of comprehensiveness, internal cohesion, and national
boundary. In other words, the legal system contains all that pertains to law within
a nation state, and all that pertains to law within a nation state operates in
coordination with everything else that pertains to law in the nation state.
A methodological problem arises, which is how do you know what pertains to
law and what does not? The "formalists" among these jurists solve this problem
by focusing on a narrow band of enacted law, principally statutes, constitutions,
and judicial opinions that are officially recognized as legal authority.10 The
"functionalists" among these jurists developed another widely accepted method in
the field of comparative law for determining what comprises a legal system. They
look at the functions of law and which societal needs or demands it fills and which
it does not. 1 Unfortunately, functionalism also leaves unanswered the question of
how we know law when we see it, because the method neither embraces the
possibility that law can take infinitely various forms, nor does it identify a set of
attributes of law in all cultures and all times. The method has been successful,
however, in broadening the narrow, positivistic view of law that gained sway in the
nineteenth century in Europe and the United States to include institutions and
society.
Applying a functionalist conception of a legal system to China's media, one
role of the media is readily apparent, that is the role of media as educator of the
public about the law.
1. Media as Legal Educator
Since at least the fourteenth century, mass media has functioned as a channel
of communication between the state and society in China. China's rulers
developed devices for disseminating central policy to the populace without
personal contact with them. Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming
Dynasty, used "Placards of People's Instructions" and "Grand Pronouncements" to
communicate the law en masse to his subjects. 12  The Placards were imperial
decrees that contained references to the Ming Code and to the Grand
Barton, The Structure of Legal Systems, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 291, 292-93 (1992) (attempting to define
"legal system"); Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of
the Legal System, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 1419 (1992) (attempting to define "legal system").
10. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decises, Legal
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 169-70 (2006).
11. Functionalism as a method used to research in the field of comparative law is superbly
described and analyzed in Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61-65 (1984)
(describing and analyzing functionalism as a method used to research in the field of comparative law);
Lawrence M. Friedman, Lawyers in Cross-Cultural Perspective, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:
COMPARATIVE THEORIES 1, 2-4 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, eds., 1988) (describing and
analyzing functionalism as a method used to research in the field of comparative law); Stanley Lubman,
Studying Contemporaty Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities and Strategy, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 293-
294, 330-32 (1991) (describing and analyzing functionalism as a method used to research in the field of
comparative law).
12. FARMER, supra note 3, at 15-17.
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Pronouncements, and also added to the codified law.' 3 For example, one Placard
exhorted people to pay taxes and perform their corvee labor duties, both as
provided in the Ming Code.14 Other provisions of the Placard added to the codified
law by making certain codified provisions applicable explicitly to the lijia1 5 elders,
and making them responsible for enforcing the law at the local level.1 6 The Grand
Pronouncements were four groups of 236 imperial instructions promulgated
between 1385 and 1387.17 Zhu disseminated the Placards and Pronouncements
through a variety of methods. The Ministry of Revenue was responsible for
"clearly publish[ing] . [the Placards] throughout the realm," and students
memorized the Pronouncements as assignments in school and investigated their
enforcement while traveling in teams.18
Imperial programs during the period of Qing rule sent teachers and books
around China to educate the peasantry about Confucian morals. 19 Chiang Kaishek
conducted a similar program with newspapers during the Republican period, which
was named optimistically "The New Life" movement, 20 and publicized its cultural
policy and its Anti-Japan policy during the 1930s and 1940s through the press and
film.
21
Perhaps using the media to model Zhu Yuanzhang, 22 Mao Zedong and the
central leadership of the CCP depended on film, radio, and print mass media
during the Party's first several decades to channel official policy both to Party
loyalists at the grass-roots level and to those who had not yet allied themselves
with the Party.23 With the national legislature and the judicial bureaucracy
disbanded, when the media transmitted Party policy to those responsible for its
implementation, it functioned as the only legal system of its time. Yet, the central
government characterized as "education" both the media transmissions and the
personal instruction of the public by cadres, who received their instructions
through the media, perhaps because Mao Zedong promoted a negative view of
13. See id. at 9-17.
14. Id. at 95.
15. Lijia were community structures for surveillance, security, and tax collection. Sarah
Schneewind, Visions and Revisions: Village Policies of the Ming Founder in Seven Phases, 87 T'OUNG
PAO 317, 332 (2001).
16. FARMER, supra note 3, at 98.
17. Id. at 53-54.
18. Id. at 102, Appendix Three (Jiao Min Bang Wen, The Placard of People's Instructions
(originally found in Ming Studies 7:63-72 (George Jerlang Chang trans., 1978) and revised by Edward
L. Farmer and Jiang Yonglin)).
19. FARMER, supra note 3, at 35-36.
20. JONATHAN T. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 414-15 (1990).
21. See Stephen R. MacKinnon, Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period,
23 MODERN CHINA 16 (1997).
22. FARMER, supra note 3, at 105.
23. Personal contact with "the masses" was the path to membership in the Party for youthful
recruits, and Mao Zedong relied on young activists to carry out the purges of 1966-1968. The official
media sent signals about whom the activists should target. See EZRA F. VOGEL, CANTON UNDER
COMMUNISM 55, 322 (2d ed. 1969).
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law.24  When legal institutions and statutes reappeared in the late 1970s, the
government portrayed them as part of the government's broader effort to guide the
general population morally, politically, and economically.25  Legal scholars of
China identify an educative role of law in the 1980s. Michael Palmer, for
example, contends that the PRC central government enacted the 1980 Marriage
Law with the intention to educate the public about a new purpose for adoption with
its provision on adoption.26
In its function of educating the population about law, the media is a vehicle,
but an indispensable one, and one that exerts its own impact upon the legal system.
According to Victor Li, the Party leaders used the media to publicize the law
because China did not have lawyers or other legal professionals to serve as
27intermediaries between the central leadership and the masses. While the
capabilities of media allowed them to disseminate the law widely, the limitations
of media simplified the message about law that was transmitted. As Li concluded,
the law speaks directly to the general public through the mass media.
The use of this channel affects the language of the law, which must be
stated in simple colloquial terms rather than technical jargon. The
specific rules cannot be very detailed or complicated, since the mass
media can convey only broad ideas By using the mass media to
communicate legal norms directly to the public, China in effect has
taken a path to overcoming the public's ignorance of the law that we [in
the United States] have rejected. China does not subscribe to the legal
fiction that everyone knows the law, but instead, has carried out a
massive program of public education about the law. The scope of this
program is as overwhelming in Chinese terms as the number of lawyers
is astounding in American terms.
28
Even after the number of lawyers in the PRC grew to exceed 100,000 at the
end of the twentieth century,2 9 the central government's program to educate the
masses about law showed no signs of abating. In October of 1995, attorney Zhang
Yong, Deputy Division Chief of the Publicity Department of the Beijing Bureau of
the Ministry of Justice, described his job as helping to formulate a five-year plan
for the education of ordinary people (the laobaixing) about the 152 laws that will
be enacted in the PRC in the next five years.30  That job entailed organizing
24. See VICTOR H. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA AND
THE UNITED STATES 42 (1978).
25. See id
26. Michael Palmer, Adoption Law in the People's Republic of China, in YEARBOOK ON
SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS 9 (W.E. Butler ed., 1986).
27. LI, supra note 24, at 42.
28. Id. Li depicts in universal terms the need to educate the public about the law that governs it,
and credits the PRC with doing a better job of this than the United States. See id. at 35-42.
29. Number of Lawyers Rapidly Rising in China, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], July 8, 2002,
available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/Life/36430.htm.
30. Zhang Yong, Deputy Division Chief of the Publicity Dept. of the Beijing Bureau of the
Ministry of Justice, Speech in Minneapolis, MN (Oct. 1995) (on file with author); Zhang Yong, Resume
VOL. 39:3
MEDIA PRODUCTS AS LAW
"special legal lectures for top Chinese leaders," "[e]xamining and approving
textbooks of specialized law which are edited by other government branches," and
"supervising the production of 'Communication of Promotion of Mass Legal
Education Magazine."' 3  From Zhang's career path thus far, propaganda work
appears to be plentiful enough to offer the loyal and energetic a fast track to
prominence in the PRC government. At the tender age of 30, he had already
obtained a Master of Law degree, interned in a law firm, interned as a judge,
worked his way up through three positions in the Ministry of Justice, and published
eight articles-one entitled "Mass Legal Education: A Tough Job in China," and
another entitled "The Key to Public Legal Education Lies in Persistence and
Implementation."
32
As active as the legal education program continued to be, by 1995 it had
changed to become more high-tech and more oriented toward entertainment than in
1980. The Ministry of Justice assigned four of its five bureaus jurisdiction over a
different medium or media industry: 1) legal publications (newspapers and books);
2) audio-visual productions; 3) entertainment programs; and 4) companies that
produce publications and videos for both domestic sale and for export.33
One example of an audio-visual production aiming to educate the public
about law was a television program in Shanghai in 1993 called "Society's
Classics., 34 It featured a segment called "Law's Letterbox" in which a lawyer
from the Number 10 Law Firm of Shanghai answered questions about law that
viewers wrote in to the program. One question was a reaction to a story the
program had run earlier about a woman who abused her child, accompanied by
gruesome photos. The viewer asked if there were any regulations prohibiting child
abuse. The lawyer responded that there were some relevant Shanghai regulations
that implemented the prohibitions in national criminal and marriage laws.
35
Far from presenting the staff of the Ministry of Justice's propaganda
departments with opportunities for developing maverick interpretations of the law,
this legal education program is highly official and is linked to the top leadership by
the oversight of the State Council. In addition to its need to conform to the dictates
of the State Council, the Ministry of Justice coordinates its legal education work
with the Party's Central Propaganda Department, as do other Ministries in
Beijing.36
(Sept. 15, 1995) (on file with author). The Ministry of Justice is the central government executive
agency in Beijing that oversees a nationwide effort to educate the public about central law and policy.
Apart from operating law schools in major cities throughout the PRC, the Ministry sponsors a variety of
less specialized legal education programs, such as lecture circuits into remote areas by junior law
professors. Ministry of Justice: The People's Republic of China (2009), http://english.moj.gov.cn/.
31. Zhang Yong, supra note 30.
32. Id
33. Id. A fifth bureau was responsible for investigating law enforcement. Id.
34. Shehuijingzhuan--falu xinxiang, (June 22, 1993) (viewed by the author).
35. Id.
36. Carry Out In Still Better Way Activities That Enjoy Ardent Support of People, RENMIN RIBAO
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2. Media as Legitimizer and Enforcer of the Law
Do the media's transmissions related to law in the PRC perform functions other
than an educative one? Yes; and these functions are even closer than an educative
function is to what makes media part of the legal system of China. The media in
China also legitimates the law of China and helps enforce it.
Scholars of Chinese law long have argued that law legitimizes the
government that promulgates it and enforces it.37  This notion, though a
mainstream view in American scholarship on China, would appear to turn on its
head the traditional Chinese doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, where virtue and
harmony in the realm signaled the legitimacy of the imperial regime, and the laws
the desperate resort to, violent impositions of order used only by a usurper. The
Chinese classics stressed the ruler's influence on morals throughout the realm by
the sheer force of example. 38 Indeed, one counterargument to the legitimizing
function of law in China is that law does not, and never has, legitimized its makers
and enforcers in China because law must be backed up with force in order to be
enforced. 39 This counterargument, in my view, however, has to be treated with
caution. It is a relic of centuries of attempts to discredit the Chinese Legalist
School of the fourth century B.C.,40 and only partially reflects the way China has
been ruled during the past six hundred years. The founder of the Ming Dynasty
believed he was restoring the Mandate of Heaven and legitimacy to the throne by
promulgating a law code.4 1  Decades earlier, during the Yuan Dynasty, the
prominent neo-Confucian group of Jinhua literati promoted law as a tool for
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], Feb. 15, 1996, at 1 (translated to English from PRC: Commentator Praises Two
Mass Support Activities, FBIS-CHI-96-039, Feb. 27, 1996) (on file with author). This Department does
not appear to disseminate the most important economic regulations. Interview by the author with Shen
Xiaohong, Director of the Council for Int'l Educ. Exchange Nanjing University Program, in New
Haven, CT (Aug. 11, 1996) (on file with author).
37. Hilary K. Josephs, Labor Law in a 'Socialist Market Economy': The Case of China, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 559, 560, 581 (1995); Pitman B. Potter, Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and
Legal Culture in Post-Mao China, 138 CHINA Q. 325, 358 (1994) ("Efforts at legal reform... represent
an attempt by the post-Mao regime to rest legitimacy in part on an ideology of formal law .... [Tlhe
post-Mao regime's decision to ride the tiger of legal reform has created an interdependency between
legal culture and political legitimacy for the first time in the PRC's history--leaving a lasting legacy that
will influence the relationship between law and politics for some time to come.").
38. Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND
THE INDIVIDUAL 27, 31 (1957) (A good ruler and his ministers would, on the one hand, provide the
people with an example of proper behavior according to li .... and on the other hand would educate the
people in li.).
39. See ZHENGYUAN FU, CHINA'S LEGALISTS: THE EARLIEST TOTALITARIANS AND THEIR ART OF
RULING 11-13 (1996). Epstein argues that in Europe, in contrast to China, "law functions as an
ideology, that is, a system and structure of legal ideas which secure compliance without the need for
legitimation outside the legal system .... EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 214.
40. For an accessible discussion of the tenets of the Legalist School, see ZHENGYUAN FU,
CHINA'S LEGALISTS: THE EARLIEST TOTALITARIANS AND THEIR ART OF RULING (1996). Fu's
portrayal of Chinese legalism itself builds a case against this tradition.
41. FARMER, supra note 3, at 81.
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42
restoring order and morality. Certainly, Comrade Deng Xiaoping and his
successor President Jiang Zemin have portrayed the PRC legal system as a way to
restore order and morality after the Cultural Revolution and the infiltration of
43foreign influences during the Open Door era.
In the latter part of the twentieth century, legal comparativists and historians
commonly viewed the enforcement of law as a part of a legal system.
Comparativists Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Wallace Gordon, and Christopher
Osakwe view the social context of the law in any country to hold important clues
about how the law is enforced.44 Leading scholars in the field of Chinese law build
into some of the most influential studies in the field, the assumption that the
implementation or enforcement of the law is an integral part of the PRC's legal
system.45
It is not readily apparent how media transmissions about law might help either
to legitimize the government or to enforce law. Political legitimacy seems to
imply some agreement between ruler and ruled, whereas print and broadcast media
permit only a one-way communication. Enforcement seems to imply some sort of
coercion or threats backed up with violence, while the media simply convey
messages and images. It is difficult to see how dispensing information, with its
passive connotations, can enforce law, which is something with active
connotations. Law enforcement also conjures up images of personal knowledge
and contact, such as police officers arresting suspects, and prosecutors arguing for
the conviction of criminal defendants, whereas media permit communication
without personal contact. Yet both functions of the media in China's legal system
are apparent in the use of various media by China's rulers since the fourteenth
century. For at least six hundred years, the state-run media have attempted to
legitimize the ruler by showing him to be in sync with the values of the Chinese
population. The same media also attempted to enforce the ruler's values by
inculcating in the public his models for behavior.
Zhu Yuanzhang's approach to governing was populist according to Edward
Farmer, in the sense that the written instructions upon which Zhu's reform
42. Id. at 27-28.
43. See Deng Xiaoping, CHINA DAILY, June 25, 2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/25/content_342508.htm; Zhaohui Hong & Yi Sun, In Search of Re-
ideologization and Social Order, in DILEMMAS OF REFORM IN JIANG ZEMIN'S CHINA, 42-46 (Andrew
James Nathan, Zhaohui Hong, & Steven Smith eds., 1999).
44. See MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 11 (2nd ed., 1994).
45. See, e.g., William P. Alford, Don't Stop Thinking About . . Yesterday: Why There Was No
Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3, 11-18
(1993); Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got To Do With It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in
China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 30-36 (1991); Sharon Hom, Female Infanticide in China: the
Human Rights Spector and Thoughts Towards (an) other Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249,
263-73 (1992); Pitman Potter, Riding the Tiger: Legitimation and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China,
138 CHINA Q., (June 1994).
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programs depended were disseminated directly to the people.46 Yet the messages
in the "Placards of the People's Instruction" and "Grand Pronouncements" were
populist in the additional sense that they were designed to restore widely admired
Han Chinese ideology and customs after centuries of rule by foreigners; and thus,
they showed Zhu's solidarity with his subjects.47 For example, one placard
provided that the ljia elders should discipline "rowdies" and urge the people "to
do good" and endure minor conflicts without resort to litigation.48 This last
exhortation, in particular, rung with a sense of the Mandate of Heaven, which
valued harmony over the airing of disputes. The placard further provided that six
times a month, children were to guide blind, physically disabled, or old people
through the village streets to ring a bell and shout "be filial to your parents, respect
superiors, maintain harmony with neighbors, instruct and discipline sons and
grandsons, live and work in peace and contentment, do no wrongful acts."'
49
Using these placards and pronouncements to exhort his subjects to follow
traditional Chinese models of inter-generational behavior was also part of an
authoritarian approach to governing, in that Zhu attempted to change his subjects
by enforcing standards that he selected and formulatedf 0 He delegated to the lijia
elders the responsibility to supervise all the farming in their locality, and he
exhorted each person, particularly those in Henan and Shandong Provinces, to
produce more food and cloth of silk and cotton.5'
Although the imperial governments during the Qing Dynasty, the regime of
Yuan Shikai during the early Republic, and the republican government led by
Chiang Kaishek's Guomindang were never able to take control of the most widely
circulating newspapers in order to funnel their own messages through them, these
governments censored newspapers with impunity and the Guomindang's Ministry
of Central Propaganda dispensed central policy to the public through its own
newspapers such as the "Central Daily. 52 The Guomindang censored even the
"small newspapers," a term
46. FARMER, supra note 3, at 105.
47. Id. at 104-06.
48. Id. at Appendix Three 14, 16, 18 (Jiao Min Bang Wen, The Placard of People's
Instructions (originally found in Ming Studies 7:63-72 (George Jerlang Chang trans. 1978) and revised
by Edward L. Farmer and Jiang Yonglin)).
49. Id. 19.
50. See id. at 13-17.
51. Id. at 195, 203-05; see also id at 110-13 (discussing Zhu Yuanzhang's efforts to both reflect
and to change Chinese social norms with the law he promulgated). The neo-Confucian doctrines that
Zhu Yuanzhang made the foundation of his government were popular in the sense that private teachers
and scholars during the Tang and Song dynasties propagated them before they were made part of the
state's ideology. See id. at 25-32.
52. See QIN ZHAODE, A HISTORY OF SHANGHAI'S MODERN PRESS 59-100 (1993) (on file with
author); DANIEL K. BERMAN, WORDS LIKE COLORED GLASS: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN TAIWAN'S
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 100-21 (1992); Stephen R. MacKinnon, Toward a History of the Chinese
Press in the Republican Period, 23.1 MOD. CHINA 3, 15-17 (1997); Sophia Wang, The Independent
Press and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of the Dagong bao in Republican China, 67.2 PAC. AFF.
216, 221, 229, 233, 240 (1994); see also Zhiwei Xiao, Film Censorship in China, 1927-1937 134-170
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coined as early as 1917 in Shanghai, where the genre was born. At that
time, the term reflected both the short length of the pieces published and
the amusing nature of their content. Although many of the papers
specialized in popular topics of particular interest to Shanghainese of the
time, such as late Qing art, the Guomindang feared the potential of these
papers for political resistance, and enacted regulations that limited their
content to simple and trivial topics, such as celebrity gossip, and
prohibited them from publishing on foreign or domestic affairs.
54
The Chinese Communist Party [quickly] took advantage of the
capabilities of the new electronic media of the 1920s and expanded the
scope of both the legitimizing and enforcing functions of the state-run
media. [In its early years,] the Party focused on solidifying its control
of the press, radio, and film, and in sending messages through these
media that showed its solidarity with the people. To these ends, in the
1930s, a vibrant period for both the press and Shanghai's film industry,
the Chinese Communist Party ran its own newspapers55 and organized
China's first film society. 6  In the 1930s and 1940s, Communists
produced films designed to show the Party's patriotism by emphasizing
its anti-Japan stance.57 By 1953, the Chinese Communist Party had
banned foreign films and turned China's film industry into a mouthpiece
for Soviet and Chinese communism.58 At the same time, the Party
closed or assumed control of the radio stations and of the hundreds of
newspapers that had flourished in Shanghai, Canton, and other cities
during the Republican era.59 In the 1940s and early 1950s, these
publications publicized the Party's widely heralded efforts to give land
60to poor farmers.
During the important political movements of the 1950s and 1960s,
the Party used the media under its control to attempt to influence public
behavior. Mao Zedong and other top leaders sent signals through the
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego) (on file with author).
53. Lee, supra note 1, at 239, citing ZHAODE, supra note 52.
54. Id. at 133-134.
55. Id. citing MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 3, 4-5, 7, 16; ALAN P. L. LIU, MIT CTR. FOR INT'L
STUD., The Press and Journals in Communist China 8-12 (1966).
56. Lee, supra note 1 at 133. citing CINEMA AND CULTURAL IDENTITY: REFLECTIONS ON FILMS
FROM JAPAN, INDIA, AND CHINA 161 (Wimal Dissanayake ed., 1988).
57. Id. citing PAUL CLARK, The Sinification of Cinema: The Foreignness of Film in China, in
CINEMA AND CULTURAL IDENTITY: REFLECTIONS ON FILMS FROM JAPAN, INDIA, AND CHINA 177-80
(Wimal Dissanayake ed., 1988).
58. Id. citing CINEMA AND CULTURAL IDENTITY: REFLECTIONS ON FILMS FROM JAPAN, INDIA,
AND CHINA, supra note 57, at 161-63; see also VOGEL, supra note 23, at 83-84; MA QIANG, Chinese
Film in the 1980s: Art and Industrn, in CINEMA AND CULTURAL IDENTITY: REFLECTIONS ON FILMS
FROM JAPAN, INDIA, AND CHINA 166-67 (Wimal Dissanayake ed., 1988); CLARK, supra note 57, at 177-
80.
59. Lee, supra note 1, citing VOGEL, supra note 23, at 83-88.
60. Id. citing VOGEL, supra note 23, at 111, 152; see LIU, supra note 56, at 34-36.
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press and radio to political activists about whom to target, how
vigorously to implement Party programs, and which sanctions to mete
out to those who resisted.61 Local-level cadres followed the instructions
they received through the media to enforce central campaigns through
62personal contact with the people in their jurisdiction. 2 Personal contact
with "the masses" was the path to membership in the Party for youthful
recruits, and Mao Zedong relied on young activists to carry out his most
radical programs, such as land reform and the purges of 1966-1968. 61 In
official terms, the central leadership by the end of the 1970s, had a
commitment to "mass participation and mass control," which it
accomplished through "communication with the masses" directly by
media or by way of cadres informed by media.
64
Where the media communicates the law to those responsible for enforcing the
law, the media plays a clear role in law enforcement. But how do media
transmissions legitimatize the law-maker where the law-maker is not present to
obtain the public's endorsement? And how do media transmissions sent directly to
the public enforce the law that is being communicated? In other words, where no
human being is present to enforce the acceptance of the message, how might the
media achieve the kind of transformation in the viewer that would lead to
voluntary compliance with the law? Two prominent sociological theories of law
enforcement help to explain both of these processes. In one theory, Emile
Durkheim maintained that the state reinforces society's values when it punishes
criminals. 65 In the other, Michel Foucault argued that the state inculcates norms
66
when it punishes criminals.
Durkheim's theory of punishment emphasized its communitarian nature.
When the state subjects an individual to its penal institutions, he asserted, the state
expresses the outrage of the "collective conscience," with the result that society
grows healthier and more unified.67  As David Garland interprets Durkheim,
punishment is a ritual, "directed less at the individual offender than at the audience
of impassioned onlookers whose cherished values and security had been
momentarily undermined by the offender's actions."
68
Foucault demonstrated that the state valued its subjects' labor and physical
submission, even when those punishments were done within the hidden confines of
61. Lee, supra note 1, supra note 23, at 55-59.
62. Id. citing VOGEL, supra note 23, at 55-59, 200.
63. Id. citing VOGEL, supra note 23, at 55, 111, 152, 200, 202, 208, 211, 321-23 (documenting
clear examples of path to membership in the Party).
64. Id. citing Li, supra note 24, at 42.
65. DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 105-10.
66. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 92-101.
67. See DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 80, 102-105, 108-109.
68. David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 123 (1991)
(referring to Durkheim's view of punishment).
VOL. 39:3
MEDIA PRODUCTS AS LAW
a prison.69 The rigorous discipline of timetables and work meted out onto the
bodies of prisoners inside the prisons induced the self-discipline of work regimens
and productivity among the middle classes by modeling something less offensive
and closer to the daily lives of people than public corporal punishment would have.
In this way, penal servitude "insert[ed] the power to punish more deeply into the
social body" than did public punishment.70 Sexual behaviors are regulated with a
similar system. He observed that, in classical Greece and Rome, leading
authorities wrote popular treaties that prescribed regimens for the body that helped
instill self-discipline.7' Spiritual or philosophical masters or directors helped
people "train" their habits to avoid pleasure.
72
Although they opened our eyes to the vital role played by communication
from law-giver to subject, neither Durkheim nor Foucault specified the exact
means of communication by the state to the populace. Needless to say, media do
not figure into their visions of the relationship between legal enforcement and
society, but their theories are consistent with media serving as the means of
communicating the state's norms. In fact, each author so stresses the importance
of this communication in the criminal justice systems of Europe, that the next
question really is "by what means?" Durkheim does not explain whether the
healing and unifying effects of official punishment can occur without society
knowing about the act of punishment. It is possible that Durkheim had in mind a
kind of invisible channeling that did not depend on actually informing society
about the punishment. The church played a role, in Durkheim's view, in
inculcating morals, and in so doing performed the communication about
punishment that would otherwise been left to the state. In the absence of the
church, however, the beneficial effects of punishment that Durkheim envisioned
are felt when the state communicates to society the fact of its law enforcement.
Thus, when the media disseminate information about retributive acts performed by
the state, they provide a means for satisfying deeply felt needs of society.
By pointing us to the vindication felt by observers of criminal punishments,
Durkheim's framework helps explain how the media helps to legitimize China's
law. This dynamic can be seen by analyzing televised footage of criminal convicts
being led to their execution, and of criminal trials that were broadcast on the
evening news in the mid-1990s. 73 The convicts were rarely allowed to speak, were
not allowed to sit, their heads were bowed, and their hands were bound with rope.
7 4
69. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 28, 104-112; see also Garland, supra note 68, at 138-39.
70. Id. at 82 (referring to 181h Century penal reforms).
71. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE CARE OF THE SELF: VOLUME 3 OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY,
99-147 (Robert Hurley trans., 1986).
72. See id. at 39-45.
73. Shanghai Evening News (television broadcast in Mandarin June 25, 1993) (a criminal trial in
the Pudong People's Court broadcast on the evening news in Mandarin in Shanghai) (viewed by the
author).
74. Id. An American reporter observed that "Mass trials are a fixture on TV news, showing
prisoners bound with rope, their heads bowed." George Wehrfritz, "Crime: 'You Die, I Live,"'
NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1996, at 67. The footage of criminal convicts being led to their execution was
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Footage of the capture of criminals in the act was also broadcast. On one news
show, for example, a reporter in a live broadcast had staked out a brothel and
surprised a prostitute and her client at some point during their transaction.75 As the
police restrained the hapless couple and hurried them into the police car, the
reporter asked them what they were doing and how they arranged it.76 Fictional
stories depicted criminal behavior in a negative light, and the official response to it
in a positive light. One television drama broadcast in Shanghai showed petty
corruption by a cafe owner. Police, impervious to his little bribes, carefully
investigated, nailed him in the act, and gave him a citation.77 Privately, the cafe
owner was unrepentant, and this portended future trouble for him.
In appealing to the viewers' sense of social face and propriety, these
broadcasts laid the foundation for the kind of communion between state and
society envisioned by Durkheim. 79 It was a communion of mutual reinforcement.
These broadcasts of criminal behavior and punishment appealed to the viewer's
sense of social face and propriety by inviting the viewer to distance himself or
herself from the actions portrayed as illegal and the punitive consequences of those
actions, and by depicting the illegal behavior in a negative light and the official
action in a positive light. Those who were charged with criminal offenses
appeared to be ashamed, and were treated as though they had done something
offensive and had to be separated from society. The enforcers of the law never
appeared to act impetuously or violently, but instead led to punish only those who
had done something flagrantly shameful; and so the state appeared to respond to
wrongful acts with forbearance and good cause. The broadcasts also appealed to
the viewer's sense of vulnerability and need for protection by portraying the
purpose of government intervention as the protection of society from criminal
deviance.
Durkheim does not shed light upon how vindicating the media consumer's
sense of social face and propriety or stimulating his sense of need for state
punishment of others might lead to the consumer's own voluntary compliance with
the law, but Foucault's theory of the relationship between the state and society
does shed light upon the law-enforcing function of state-run media in the PRC.80
Just as he observes that the state communicates to society through the operation of
prison discipline, the desirability of voluntary discipline, and backs it up with the
broadcast in Hong Kong and recounted in an interview by the author with Professor Joseph Man Chan,
of the Department of Journalism and Communication, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Interview
with Professor Joseph Man Chan, Department of Journalism and Communication, Chinese University
of Hong Kong, in Minneapolis, MN (June 29, 1996) (on file with author).
75. Shanghai Evening News (television broadcast in Mandarin June 25, 1993) (viewed by the
author).
76. Id.
77. Shanghai Television Drama Series (television broadcast in Mandarin May 28,1993) (viewed
by the author).
78. Id.
79. See DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 105-10.
80. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 23, 137-38, 195-228.
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threat of forced compliance, the state may transmit through the media images to
which the state attaches its approval, and thereby exhort the public to follow these
as models. 8' The exhortation comes packaged with the threat that the state will
force reeducation upon the individual who does not conform his behavior, on his
own, to the model.
The television broadcasts described above aimed to instill in the viewer a kind
of self-discipline, which was a part of the submission by the individual to the state
envisioned by Foucault.82 They implied that the viewer did not have a choice
about whether to accept the message about these actions. They encouraged the
audience to identify with those who were caught and punished because they
embedded these messages in stock characters and in situations that were familiar to
viewers. The broadcasts appealed to the viewer's sense of shame by exposing the
plight of an offender who has been caught. They also appealed to the viewer's
sense of fear by portraying the government's punishment of offenders as swift and
strict, thereby conditioning the expectations of the viewer about the likelihood and
the type of correction, if the viewer defied the official interpretation of the law. By
showing people caught in the act, the broadcasts also undermined the viewer's
sense of privacy and strengthened the suggestion of surveillance of the viewer.
Although Durkheim and Foucault supply conceptual frameworks that reveal
how communication of the fact of law enforcement both legitimizes the law and
attempts to enforce the law, Durkheim focuses on criminal punishments and
Foucault on prisons. Can media transmissions play a role in areas of the legal
system that do not deal with criminal law? The essential element of criminal law,
upon which Durkheim and Foucault focus, is coercion. In Durkheim's model of
criminal punishment, the state metes out coercive violence against the convict in
83order to appease the collective conscience. To Foucault, the communication to
84
society of legal punishments is itself coercive. By communicating a model for
behavior along with the threat of forced compliance if voluntary compliance is not
forthcoming, the state co-opts the individual to, in essence, coerce himself or suffer
the consequence of coerced restraint and retraining.
To grasp the scope with which media operates within China's legal system,
then, it is necessary to understand whether coercion is limited to criminal
sanctions. Legal scholar Edward Epstein argues that all law in the PRC is
enforceable only with the threat of coercion,85 and according to anthropologist
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 80-81, 102-05.
84. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 4.
85. Epstein argues that in the PRC, coercion is necessary to make law constrain behavior. He
goes so far as to identify coercion as the essential difference between the enforcement of Chinese law
and of European law. Epstein, supra note 4, at 214. In Europe, he argues, law does not need coercion
for its enforcement, because "law is accepted into consciousness because of its ideological impact,"
Edward J. Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao China, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-
MAO CHINA 19, 30 (Pitman B. Potter, ed., 1994). Under this theory, state-run media would have to
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Carole Nagengast, coercion includes subtle forms of emotional manipulation, or
threats of acts other than "direct violence. 86 She identifies various manifestations
of coercive violence that go beyond the "practical, physical, visible, and personal,"
to include the "symbolic," the "emotional," the "invisible (as in witchcraft)," and
"from the forces of society."87 States can perpetrate all of these forms of violence,
she argues, and they often use images of "work" to describe such violence in a way
that mollifies concern about or wins support for it.
88
In the PRC, there is abundant evidence that many norms, for many people,
have been enforced with means other than physical violence. The government of
the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s developed rituals symbolic of the state's control
over the individual and methods of emotional persuasion, which were refined in
millions of "mass criticism pronouncement meetings" and small group 'struggle"
or "education" sessions throughout the PRC. 89 The officials who conducted these
events arranged the participants so that government officials were at the center, the
representatives of the People's Liberation Army were in a ring around them, and
the other participants were in a larger ring around them.90 This pattern reinforced
the message that the Chinese Communist Party was the primary surveyor of
behavior, the People's Liberation Army provided the secondary ring of
surveillance, and the masses formed the tertiary ring of surveillance. Rural cadres
in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s were instructed by the central government in
the communication techniques and the terminology of the hour, so that the cadres
could personally "educate" the masses. 91 This process turned the cadres into
channels of communication not just of the current policy from the central
leadership to the masses, but also of the behavior of the masses to the central
leadership.92
Whether such efforts to enforce central policy went so far as to brainwash the
public, at least in the cities, is debatable, 93 but it nonetheless aimed to instill values
through time-honored Chinese techniques of rote memorization and recitation of
pithy texts.94  The PRC government has used a variety of devices to control
serve as an instrument of coercion if it were to function as a part of the legal system of the PRC.
Epstein does not identify what coercion is, however, and so does not illuminate how messages
transmitted by media might coerce.
86. Carole Nagengast, Violence, Terror, and the Crisis of the State, 23 ANN. REV. OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 109, 114 (1994).
87. Id. at 111.
88. Id. at 123-24.
89. MICHAEL R. DUTTON, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT IN CHINA: FROM PATRIARCHY TO "THE
PEOPLE" 262-70 (1992); see Lung-Sheng Tao, Politics and Law Enforcement in China. 1949-1970, 22
AM. J. OF COMP. LAW 713, 744-45 (1974).
90. DUTTON, supra note 89, at 269.
91. See id. at 269-70.
92. See Lung-Sheng Tao, supra note 89, at 745.
93. Yuefeng Wang, Informal Behaviour Control has Never Dominated in China, 1 ASIA PAC. L.
REV. 104, 107-08 (1992).
94. William Alford skillfully identifies this approach to education in his work on intellectual
property law in China. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
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individuals, including not just incarceration, where representatives of the state
could exert physical control over individuals, but also neighborhood intelligence
operations, which facilitated the socialization of individuals who lived in
government-subsidized housing.95
In the PRC, then, disseminating messages from the center through centrally
orchestrated media to broad swathes of the population is one method of
communicating to the public central interpretations of law, but also a method that
is designed to accomplish a variety of goals. These communications are delivered
to educate the public about the correct interpretations of the law, to legitimate the
law by portraying the lawmakers as reinforcing widely held public values, and to
enforce the law by persuading about the merits of adhering to the correct
interpretations of the law and threatening forced reeducation if these interpretations
are not adhered to. While the personal application of social and psychological
pressure helps to achieve all three goals, there can be little doubt that, given the
PRC government's vast program to communicate central law to its subjects and to
shape public behavior in conformity to that law, the media form an additional and
important component of the Chinese government's legal system.
B. Media as Sources of Law
Though media transmissions function as an integral part of the PRC legal
system, can they also be considered "sources of law"? In other words, can a
lawyer discern the law in the PRC from media transmissions? This is more
difficult to show than to show that media transmissions form a part of the legal
system of the PRC because the concept of "sources of law" is narrower than the
concept of "legal system." 96 The concept of "sources of law" was developed by
law scholars in continental Europe, where law tends to be conceived in greater
abstraction than it tends to be in the United States,97 but it is a concept with
practical implications because lawyers need to know where to look for the law in
order to advise clients in an accurate and fully-informed fashion, and legal scholars
too need to know which materials contain authoritative articulations of the law.
98
There is no consensus about the meaning of the concept of "sources of law,"
but it is nonetheless an important concept in the field of comparative law and
perhaps one of growing importance to the field of statutory interpretation. The
major comparative law textbooks in the United States and Germany use "sources
of law" as a basic, organizing concept. 99 On the question of what constitutes
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 22, 27-29 (1995).
95. See DUTTON, supra note 89, at 189-245.
96. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN 0. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 50-51 (1994).
97. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 70 (1992).
98. This point forcefully comes across in THOMAS O'MALLEY, THE ROUND HALL GUIDE TO THE
SOURCES OF LAW 1-8 (1993); see also PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 28
(1995).
99. See MERRYMAN ET. AL., supra note 96, at 937-944, 1276; RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER,
COMPARATIVE LAW xxviii-xxvix, 222, 494-653 (4th ed., 1980): ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 97, at
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"sources of law," comparative legal scholars in the west divide into two camps, the
formalists, and their counterpoints, the functionalists.100 Formalists view enacted
law as the predominant and primary source of law in "civil law countries,"
supplemented by custom and by judicial and academic interpretations of the law.1
0 1
Almost as an afterthought, formalist comparativists classify constitutions as
enacted law also.'0 2 Formalists would expand the concept of "primary sources of
law" in the United States and other "common law countries" to include judicial
opinions along with enacted law, but would add little else. 0 3 To the formalist, all
of these sources of law wherever they appear, are written and publicly published,
and contain precisely articulated rules, which constrain public behavior and
eviscerate the discretion of judges.'0 4  To the formalist, the test of whether
something qualifies as a source of law might be whether a judge would be
influenced by the document.
The functionalist seems less interested in whether something is a source of
law, but rather places emphasis on whether law solves a problem in society.
0 5
Still, it is fair to say that the functionalist looks to find and understand the sources
of law, only he looks to society more broadly, to "politics, sociology, psychology"
and elsewhere.'0 6  Legislative history-the record of the process of a statute's
enactment-is a classic example of a source of law, which functionalists recognize
more readily than do formalists. 107 Law, as a tool of the government to engineer
71; GLENDON ET. AL., supra note 44, at xv, 192. For a comment about the lack of consensus about a
definition of "source of law," and the importance of the concept, see CRUZ, supra note 98, 28-29
(1995).
100. The classic identification and explanation of the distinction between formalism and
functionalism is in Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59-67 (1984).
101. See CRUZ, supra note 98, at 28.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 28, 44.
104. Comparative legal scholars Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Wallace Gordon, and Christopher
Osakwe count "enacted law," "custom," and "general principles of law" (developed by judges in their
published decisions), as the "primary sources of law" in civil law countries, and consider judicial and
academic interpretation of the law as lesser sources of law. GLENDON ET. AL., supra note 44, at 193-
214. A traditional legal authority in the United States defines sources of law as the origins from which
particular positive laws derive their authority and coercive force.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY Source of Law (9th ed. 2009).
105. See Gordon, supra, note 100, at 64-71. A notable example of the functionalist focus on solving
societal problems is the six-step method for comparative legal research outlined in Mauro Cappelletti,
Comparative Law Teaching and Scholarship: Method and Objectives, ASIA PAC. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1994).
106. The renowned legal comparativist Rene David epitomizes this approach. Rene David, Sources
of Law, in THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: THEIR COMPARISON AND UNIFICATION 3 (Rene David
ed., 1984). Comparativist Peter de Cruz draws generally on David's work, when he states, "Ideally, one
would need to examine politics, sociology, psychology and many other areas to seek a definitive answer
to the problem of defining a 'source of law.'' CRUZ, supra note 98, at 28.
107. For explanations of what constitutes legislative history and commonly used techniques for
interpreting it, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 698-776 (1988). The authors mention
that Justice Scalia does not view as helpful reports of legislative committees responsible for drafting or
overseeing the passage of a bill. Id. at 715. By all accounts, Justice Scalia is a formalist, in that he
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society or exert control over society, is an example of a functionalist conception of
law. 10 8 Tests of a source of law for the functionalist would include whether it fits
into the "legal landscape,"10 9 is meant to shape behavior, or actually exerts an
impact on society.
Although they may differ about how far beyond enacted law they are willing
to look for sources of law, both formalists and functionalists view authoritative
interpretations of the law as sources of law. Neither formalists nor functionalists,
however, name media transmissions as authoritative interpretations of the law, or
as any other type of "source of law." Instead, both take for granted that only
judges and scholars publish authoritative interpretations of the law, with the
possible addition of the legislators who enact the statutes.
Should the focus by legal comparativists on the interpretations of law
published by judges and legal scholars, and the omission by comparativists of any
mention of media transmissions, be taken as a definitive exclusion of media from
what are considered sources of law? No, it should not be. The fact that European
and American comparativists have not considered media transmissions sources of
law is more a function of inattention to the question and to the underdevelopment
in comparative legal discourse of the definition of sources of law than of a
reasoned exclusion of them.
Inattention to the question among western comparativists may be explained
by their assumptions about the scale and importance of the dissemination of
official information. In the American paradigm of positive law, with its emphasis
on transparency and the fiction that its subjects are on notice about what the law
contains, law is a kind of information. Given the rarity of any mention of
government in the work of social scientists that study the dissemination of
information in the United States, l l0 government in the United States appears to
favors the strict construction of legislative texts. In Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, the formalists on the United States Supreme Court
showed themselves more skeptical of the pertinent legislative history than was the more functionalist
wing of the Court. See id. at 70-84, 676-86 (citing to United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979) and Nat'l Labor Relations Bd v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)). Judges
known as legal realists or "legal process scholars" favor the use of legislative history. See id. at 593-94
(citing Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 195, 199 (1982)).
108. See Gordon, supra note 100, at 74-75 (1984); Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a
Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 805, 814 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
109. See ESKRIDGE, JR. & FRICKEY, supra note 107.
110. For prominent examples of studies of the dissemination of information and knowledge in the
United States that contain virtually no mention of government, see RONALD G. HAVELOCK ET AL,
PLANNING FOR INNOVATION THROUGH DISSEMINATION AND UTILIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE (1971)
(especially Chapters 3 and 9); EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 293-309, 364-70 (4th
ed.1995); ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920 (Alexandra Oleson &
John Voss, eds., 1979); RONALD G. HAVELOCK, THE CHANGE AGENT'S GUIDE TO INNOVATION IN
EDUCATION 210-211 (1973); DIANA CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLEGES: DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES (1972). See also Nathan Reingold, National Science Policy in a Private
Foundation: The Carnegie Institution of Washington, in ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN
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play a relatively minor role in the dissemination of information. The United States
government does not even publish its own statutes and judicial opinions, but rather
contracts with private companies to handle this job.'
Comparative legal study at its best endeavors to uncover the special features
of the subject of study," 2 but this approach generally has not been applied to the
question of sources of law. On the contrary, the predominant comparative
treatments of sources of law have used the characteristics of the "production of
law" 13 in Europe to develop models for all of the world's legal systems. Thus, all
legal systems are either code-based systems or case law systems, which are called
respectively, "Civil Law" or "Common Law" systems, terms that are historically
and geographically specific to Europe. 14 Where deviations from the two types are
recognized, the degree of deviation is the measure of the immaturity or the "lack of
penetration" by one of the European legal systems of the legal system in
question. 115
In the true spirit of comparative analysis, China's methods of producing law
should be examined tabula rasa, free from preconceptions about what a source of
law looks like. At least two characteristics of law in China call for the inclusion of
media transmissions in the sources of law. One characteristic is the close
connection between positive law and central policy, which makes formal
enactments only one of many emanations of state authority. The other
characteristic, a lack of transparency of legal regulations, is a symptom of a system
in which official interpretations of the regulations may be publicized in lieu of
their texts.
Under the formalist approach, where sources of law are defined as that which
binds judicial decisions, media transmissions in China serve as a source of law in
AMERICA, 1860-1920, 313-41 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds. 1979) (discussing the role of
government and the founding of the Carnegie Institution of Washington); A. Hunter Dupree, The
National Academy of Sciences and the American Definition of Science, in ORGANIZATION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920, 342-63 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss, eds. 1979)
(discussing the role of government and the founding of the National Academy of Sciences).
111. Noel Cox, Copyright in Statutes, Regulations, and Judicial Decisions in Common Law
Jurisdictions: Public Ownership or Commercial Enterprise, 27 STAT. L. REv. 185, 185 (2006).
112. This approach is advocated in the most learned assessments of the methods for researching
Chinese Law. See William P. Alford, On The Limits of'Grand Theory'In Comparative Law, 61 WASH.
L. REV. 945, 947 (1986); Sharon Hom, Engendering Chinese Legal Studies: Gatekeeping, Master
Discourses, and other Challenges, 19 SIGNS 1020, 1023 (1994); Stanley Lubman, Studying
Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities and Strategy, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 293-95, 339-40
(1991).
113. This is the English translation of a phrase used by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.
Bourdieu, supra note 108, at 806; see also Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education:
How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REv. 1155, 1155-
59 (2008) (discussing Pierre Bourdieu's work).
114. See GLENDON ET. AL., supra note 44, at 44-64, 438-454 (discussing the history, culture, and
distribution of civil and common law).
115. For discussions relating to this topic, see ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 97, at 63-73; Kensie
Kim, Mixed Systems in Legal Origins Analysis, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 693 (2010).
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several ways. The People 's Daily publishes "the full texts of statutes enacted by
the National People's Congress," which bind all judges in the PRC. 116 The
People's Daily also publishes "official versions of legislative history, official
interpretations of the statutes, reports of current bills under consideration by the
National People's Congress and by congresses below it, and notices of new
policies of central administrative agencies," as do the official legal newspapers,
namely the national Legal System Daily, and the regional versions, such as the
Shanghai Legal System News.'1 7  These legislative histories, interpretations of
statutes, reports of bills, and notices of administrative policies are "either not
published elsewhere, and therefore [are] the only [authoritative] versions of these
[authoritative] statements available to judges, or [are] replicas of the documents
that the Chinese Communist Party sends all judges in the PRC for study in
Tuesday afternoon "political study" (zhengzhi xue) sessions."' 118
The overlap between the publishers of these journals and those who decide on
promotions of judges is nearly complete. Both of these legal newspapers are
published by entities that are responsible for educating judges about Party policy.
"The Ministry of Justice and the Chinese Communist Party's Central Politics and
Law Commission supervise the publication of the Legal System Daily."119 The
Ministry of Justice is in charge of educating judges, and the Commission is now
headed by Ren Jianxin, the President of the Supreme People's Court, which is in
charge of disseminating to all judges presumably binding advisory opinions. 120
The Shanghai Legal System News is published by the Shanghai Bureau of Justice,
which is a local arm of the Ministry of Justice and is overseen by the Chinese
Communist Party's important body, the Shanghai Politics and Law Committee.
Both are entities that supervise the conformity of judicial opinions to Party
policy.
12 1
Serving another function as a source of law,
the legal newspapers communicate official delegations of legislative
authority by notifying local governments about their authority to enact
implementing regulations for specific statutes or policies. When the
Legal System Daily published a notice of a new policy by two central
116. Wei Luo, How to Find the Law of the People's Republic of China: A Research Guide and
Selective Annotated Bibliography, 88 L. LIBR. J. 402, 406-08,423 (1996); Lee, supra note 1, at 210.
117. Lee, supra note 1, at 210.
118. Id.
119. Lee, supra note 1, at 212; Margaret Y. K. Woo, Adjudication Supervision and Judicial
Independence in the P.R.C., 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 110 n.87 (1991).
120. Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHIN. L.
145, 150, 171 (1993).
121. See Lee, supra note 1, at 210; see also Timothy A. Gelatt, Legal and Extra-legal Issues in
Joint Venture Negotiations, 1 J. CHIN. L. 217, 230-31 (1987); SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL
SYSTEM NEWSPAPER], Mar. 25, 1996, at 1 (China) (on file with author) (providing an example of a
report about a bill concerning two national real estate laws under consideration by the Shanghai
People's Congress; Philip Baker, Party and Law in China, in STATE AND LAW IN EASTERN ASIA 17,
17-19 (Leslie Palmier ed., 1996) (providing a brief description of the Political-Legal Commission.
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departments, for example, it authorized all local governments to draft
implementing measures for it.
122
The close connection between law and policy in the PRC makes it difficult to
argue that sources of law in the PRC include only legal interpretations published
by judges, scholars, or legislators.
Judges and bureaucrats throughout China rely on and are dependent on
frequent communications of uncodified policy from the central
leadership, who occupy the top Party positions and the top executive
positions of President, Premier, and Vice Premier, or head the sixty-
some administrative ministries and agencies headquartered in Beijing. 23
Each court in the four-tiered court system of the PRC is [officially]
linked to the Chinese Communist Party [by the] practice of recruiting
judges from the ranks of the Party and the People's Liberation Army,
[and by] a procedure called "adjudication supervision" or "trial
supervision" (shenpanjiandu), which permits certain officials to reopen
an otherwise final civil or criminal judgment. 124 Each court must work
with these officials, who are designated by the Party through the
Standing Committee of the People's Congress at the same level as the
court, [a procedure that] subjects judges to pressures to implement
central policies in their decisions. 125 In a comprehensive examination of
the Supreme People's Court since the legalization campaign began in
1979, Susan Finder concludes that in all of its work, the Court is 'still
subject to Party leadership. The Court implements Central Political-
Legal Committee and other Party initiatives and clears important policy
decisions and other critical decisions with the Party leadership."
' 26
Where the power to appoint judges resides undermines the ability of judges to
make law in China. That appointment process is as follows:
the Party leaders at each administrative level, not the courts, appoint the
most powerful judges in China, [the president of each court, who] in
turn, nominate for appointment all the judges in [his] court, [and] the
People's Congress at each level approves the appointments.' This
makes courts beholden to local political interests and lessens their
interest in following judicial precedent. Even the Supreme People's
Court, which sits atop the national court system, does not appoint judges
122. Lee, supra note 1, at 213; see Junren chengche goupiao youxian de tongzhi [Notice About
Military Personnel's Priority for Purchasing Train Tickets], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY],
Oct. 4, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with author).
123. Lee, supra note 1, at 214; see Finder, supra note 120, at 148, 151; Woo, supra note 119, at
107, 115.
124. Lee, supra note 1, at 214; see Woo, supra note 120, at 97.
125. Lee, supra note 1, at 214; Woo, supra note 120, at 102, 116-117, 119.
126. Lee, supra note 1, at 214; Finder, supra note 121, at 222.
127. Lee, supra note 1, at 215; Finder, supra note 121, at 149.
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and has been relatively powerless to change the appointment process.' 2 8
The Court came closest to influencing appointments when it submitted
to the National People's Congress draft legislation for upgrading the
professional standards of the judiciary, one of the provisions of which
attempted to shift the power of appointment to the court system.129 The
NPC passed the law in 1995 after dropping the provision.
130
The relatively low status of legal scholars in the PRC further
undermines their ability to contribute authoritative interpretations of the
law. Courts take cognizance of academic articles on relevant legal
issues, but they do not accord them as much weight as Supreme Court
opinions or Party documents.1
3 1
PRC officials and China law scholars advance views about policy that are
consistent with its status as a source of law. Some view policy as the driving force
behind the law, with law functioning to cloth policy in a legitimate form.'32 Others
depict policy as a supplement to enacted law, particularly where enacted law
leaves gaps to be filled.133  Another sees law as an expression of policy, but
stresses that the power to turn this policy into law "is fragmented among numerous
individuals and organizations.' 3 4  The official position of the PRC central
government is that policy is a source of authority, and that law is closely related to
policy. 135  A popular legal treatise specifies that "where the legal structure is
incomplete, policy must function as law,"' 36 while two articles of the Organic Law
of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the PRC
rank policy as co-equal with law as a source of authority.
37
Although law reflects policy, the articulations of policy are not limited to
formal legal enactments. Policy is expressed in the words of the top leadership,
even those words that lack formal enactment. The dispensability of formal
enactment derives from the concentration of authority at the center of the PRC
128. Lee, supra note 1, at 215; see Finder, supra note 121, at 224.
129. Lee, supra note 1, at 215; Finder, supra note 121, at 224.
130. Lee, supra note 1, at 215.
131. Lee, supra note 1, at 214; see Interview with a PRC law professor (Nov. 1996) (on file with
author).
132. For a path breaking study, see Frances Hoar Foster, Codification in Post-Mao China, 30 AM.
J. COMP. L., 395,413-14 (1982).
133. For Proponents of this view, see Tao-tai Hsia & Constance Johnson, Lawmaking In China,
Part IV, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Aug. 15, 1987, text at notes 57-58.
134. A proponent of this view is Murray Scot Tanner, Organizations and Politics in China's Post-
Mao Law-Making System, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 87, (Pitman B. Potter ed.
56, 87 (1993).
135. See Hsia & Johnson, supra note 133.
136. Id.
137. Article 8 requires the local people's congresses to enforce "policies" along with "the
Constitution, laws, . . . decrees, and orders of the state .... " while Article 27 prohibits municipal law
that contradicts "policies" or "the Constitution, laws, . . . decrees, or administrative orders of the state..
" Quoted and cited in Tao-tai Hsia and Constance Johnson, "Lawmaking In China, Part IV," 1987
EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Aug. 15, 1987, text at notes 64-65.
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government, where it resides in the paramount leader, and then in descending
degrees to the individuals who occupy key posts in the Chinese Communist Party
and in the Executive Branch of the government headed by the State Council.
Power resides in the person of the ruler, and therefore, as a popular saying goes
"whatever Deng Xiaoping says is the law."
The point that law in the PRC is not limited to formal enactments can perhaps
be grasped more easily by considering that the enactment of words of authority
may have less to do with their enforcement than would the publicity of those
words. As a lover of classical Greek poetry puts it, Agamemnon's
"communications officer said, 'Sorry, King, but the world will forget [the lesson
you taught Paris in the Trojan War] overnight unless you let me sign up the blind
poet Homer to write the authorized version.' 138 A modern Chinese equivalent is
Deng Xiaoping's trip to Shenzhen during his southern tour in 1992, the home of
one of China's two stock markets.' 39 These stock markets had been operating in
China in some form since the early 1980s, and centrally approved local legal
regulations had been enacted to govern them, but the stock markets languished in a
dearth of confidence by potential investors. 140 On the force of Deng's statements
about opening the economy, publicized in the press and studied throughout China
in Tuesday afternoon "political study" sessions, the value of many stocks on the
Shenzhen stock market doubled and tripled within a few weeks, and lawyers
opened private law firms pursuant to a heretofore little-used regulation.141
Law is also articulated
without formal enactment in the 'documents' (wenjian) issued by party
organs and the central ministries and agencies of the PRC
government. 142  Those internal documents (neibu wenjian) that are
,secret' are not released to anyone outside the party, while others which
are for public consumption (zhongyao wenjian) are released directly to
all judges and law professors, to a selected group of law firms and
consulting firms, and to the public through the print and broadcast
media. 143
Judges are more likely to study the public documents than the published
regulations. 1
44
138. Russell Baker, Homer's First Yuppie, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at A17
139. See Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging
Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 62, 66-68, 84 (1993) [hereinafter
Qian, Riding Two Horses].
140. See id at 66-69; see also Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Why Does Not The Rising Water Lift the
Boat? Internationalization of the Stock Markets and the Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 29
INT'L LAW. 615, 615-18 (1995) [hereinafter Qian, Internationalization of the Stock Markets].
141. See Qian, Riding Two Horses, supra note 139, at 84, 94; Qian, Internationalization of the
Stock Markets, supra note 140, at 617-18.
142. Lee, supra note 1, at 212.
143. Id.
144. As do all government officials and teachers at every level, judges and law professors study the
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The variety of channels through which law is disseminated in the PRC
suggests, on the one hand, the irrelevance of formal enactment to authoritativeness,
and on the other hand, a spectrum of transparency.1
45
The variety of channels allows the Party to target different audiences,
both within and without Chinese officialdom, in part to tailor its
interpretations of the law to the intended audience, and also in part to
withhold information successively from larger segments of the
population. The interpretations intended for high-level Party members
are enacted and published in the media less frequently than are the
interpretations destined for low-level Party members, which in turn are
published in the media less frequently than are the interpretations
destined also for groups within the public at large. [T]he legal
interpretations intended for Chinese audiences outside of China and
foreign audiences are published in overseas arms of the party press
agency and by the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing.' 46
The policy articulations and official legal interpretations which pass through
print or broadcast media do so by virtue of the central government's control over
the output of print and broadcast media, a control that extends beyond censorship
to orchestration. 47 In such a context, virtually whatever the state-controlled media
transmits carries authoritative weight, from written or oral pronouncements of the
top leaders, which are printed in the People's Daily but not formally enacted into
law, to statements on television by an official of the Supreme People's
Procuracy, 14 8 to a speech of the Vice-President of the Supreme People's Court
published by the Court, 149 to anecdotes in a legal newspaper about children failing
to care for their elderly parents.
50
important neibu wenjian during some of their weekly staff meetings every Tuesday afternoon.
Interview by the author with Professor Zhao Jianzhuang, Professor, Henan Cadre College of Politics
and Law, (Nov. 1996) (on file with author). Meanwhile, filing cabinets full of published regulations in
the chambers of the Shanghai Intermediate Court collect dust. Remarks by Pitman Potter at the
Association for Asian Studies, (March 1994) (on file with author). The most important policy
documents on economic affairs issued by the central government now emanate from such institutions as
the People's Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation [MOFTEC], and the
Economic Planning Commission. The Central Propaganda Department is losing influence within the
central government, however, particularly over matters deemed to be economic. Interview by the
author with Shen Xiaohong, Director of the Council for International Educational Exchange Nanjing
University Program, in New Haven, Conn. (Aug. 11, 1996) (on file with author).
145. The lack of transparency of Chinese law is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Hsia & Johnson,
supra note 136, at 134, n.56, n.57; Timothy A. Gelatt, supra note 118, at 231.
146. Lee, supra note 1, at 212-13.
147. See Judy Polumbaum, Striving for Predictability: The Bureaucratization of Media
Management in China, in CHINA'S MEDIA, MEDIA'S CHINA 113, 119-21 (Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 1994).
148. For an example, an official of the Supreme People's Procuracy staff spoke to a television
broadcast in Beijing. Susan V. Lawrence, Speaking Up For Their Rights, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 10, 1996, at 50, 52.
149. In a speech at a press conference in 1988, Vice President Ma Yuan articulated the Supreme
People's Court's position on civil matters arising between parties of PRC citizenship, on the one hand,
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It is not surprising, then, that the most powerful people in the PRC are directly
linked to those in charge of the state-run media.
The vice-president of the central ministry of foreign affairs, Zhou Nan,
is also the chief of the Hong Kong bureau of the Xinhua News Agency,
the official mouthpiece of the Party in Hong Kong, and the PRC
government's premier representative there before the selection of Tung
Chee-hua as chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR) in 1996. [U]ntil then , . the Chinese equivalent of
Governor Christopher Patten, [Zhou Nan] agreed in 1996 to remain in
this post until 1999 in a bid to help minimize the disruption attending
Hong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty.151
On the Mainland,
the party permits and encourages the public to contact the press in order
to give the party feedback about its policies and to report transgressions
of the law.'5 2 The editors of the People's Daily are known to be among
the conduits to government for support of local causes [in 1996]. An
American journalist reported the story of a forty-six-year-old local party
boss and farmer from northeastern China, near the Russian border,
whose village employs him as a full-time lobbyist in Beijing.'53 As part
of his lobbying efforts, Tian Chunshan visited editors of the People's
Daily.
154
Given that un-codified versions of CCP policy and official interpretations of
law are sources of law in the PRC and are regularly disseminated through the
media, media transmissions function as sources of law. Such transmissions fit
within even the narrowest conception of "sources of law" because, in some form,
they influence judicial decisions. Although the dissemination of Party policy flows
and of Taiwanese citizenship on the other. The Supreme People's Court published the speech in a
collection of "guiding instructions." Ma Yuan, Vice President of the Supreme People's Court, First
News Conference Held by the Supreme People's Court: Some Legal Issues of the People's Court
Dealing With Civil Cases Relating to Taiwan (Aug. 9, 1988), reprinted in COLLECTION OF THE LAWS
OF THE PRC 369 (Wang Huaian, Gu Min, Lin Zhun & Sun Wanzhong eds., 1989) as cited in Tung-Pi
Chen, Bridge Across the Formosa Strait: Private Law Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China,
4 J. CHINESE L. 101, 115 n. 65 (1990). Chinese law scholar Tung-Pi Chen maintains that "the policy
statement may safely be regarded as quasi-law because it came from such a senior official." Id. at 115.
150. Tangji Yue, Fayu jiating: jiehunfa 'xi' le sanjia "huo' [Marriage Law 'Extinguishes' the Three
Families 'Fire] FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Dec. 10, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with
author).
151. Lee, supra note 1, at 238-39 n.3 (citing Interview by the author with Shen Xiaohong, supra
note 142 (on file with author)).
152. Id. at 214 (citing Judy Polumbaum, To Protect or Restrict? Points of Contention in China's
Draft Press Law, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 247, 256-57 (Pitman B. Potter ed.,
1994).
153. Id. (citing Lawrence, supra note 148, at 52).
154. Id.
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directly to courts through their adjudication, supervision committees 55 receive
their guidance from the same body that directs the nationwide legal education
campaign, the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, the Ministry of Justice falls
under the authority of the State Council, which oversees the issuance of ministerial
and agency "documents." The interpretations and policies broadly disseminated
through the media from the Ministry of Justice's legal education program and from
the ministerial "documents" may also satisfy a broader, societal conception of
"sources of law," although it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine
whether any of these interpretations actually succeed in changing people's
behavior.156 To exclude from what are considered the sources of law, un-codified
official interpretations of the law, and the written or oral pronouncements of a
leadership whose words, gestures, and symbols carry a great deal of weight in the
courtroom, in administrative offices, and in society at large, simply because in
some form they are made known to the public through media, is to ignore a major
source of legal authority simply for the sake of sounding correct according to the
paradigms of American or European jurisprudence.
II. FAMILY LAW: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN THE PRC LEGAL
SYSTEM
A discursive study of two samples of newspaper articles and official
broadcasts reveals that media in the PRC channel to the public official messages
about legally correct behavior in the ways described by Durkheim and Foucault-
Nagengast. I5 7 As Victor Li found in his study of Chinese law, the media used
simple language and avoided elaborate explanations. 158 In these samples too,
simple paraphrases of statutes screened out technical legal terms, such as a
summary in a legal newspaper by a mediator of the Marriage Law provision
governing the care of the elderly. The images of women mentioned in the legal
newspapers, who were involved in financial scams, were one-dimensional.
Despite this simplicity of language and character portrayal, however, the messages
throughout these samples also attempted to legitimize the government and to
enforce the law in the complex, psychological ways theorized by Durkheim and
Foucault-Nagengast. Thus, the messages appeared to try to assuage deeply felt
societal needs and to project models for behavior coupled with the threat of
coerced enforcement. The transmissions functioned as sources of law in the
formalist sense by being all that was available to the public by way of authoritative
elaborations of the lightly codified family planning program and the Marriage
155. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Adjudication Supervison and Judicial Independence in the P.R.C, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 96 (1991).
156. Certainly it is plausible that media transmissions do not always have their intended effect.
Frances Foster, in her impressive study of theories of information in the Russian media in the 1990s,
uncovers a wealth of examples of this in Russia. Frances H. Foster, Information and the Problem of
Democracy: The Russian Experience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 289-90 (1996).
157. See DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 80-81, 90, 109; FOUCAULT, supra note 4; Nagengast, supra
note 4, at 116.
158. VICTOR H. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA AND THE
UNITED STATES 42 (1978).
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Law. The transmissions in the sample also served as sources of law in the
functionalist sense of aiming to exert an impact on society.
The two samples of transmissions are drawn from the Xinhua news agency
publications in Chinese and English; the premier national legal newspaper, the
Legal Svstem Daily; and a major regional legal newspaper, the Shanghai Legal
System News, whose purpose is to inform city dwellers about the Party's position
on topics related to law; and official treatises. 159 The two samples are related to
family law, an area of law that is useful for examining the role of media in the
legal system and their function as sources of law, in part because the media is
governed by broadly-worded legal enactments, and yet, as a centerpiece of the
government's vision for China's prosperity at the dawn of the twenty-first century,
is subject to intensive government regulation. Therefore, if the media transmit and
supplement enacted law, they would do it in this area. Furthermore, the great
importance of this area of law ensures a rich sample of material that is likely to be
aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of the government. In Deng Xiaoping's
regime and after, family law is the rubric for decreasing the growth of China's
population, a cornerstone of the regime's effort to promote prosperity. 160 Yet
another advantage is that family law is not a part of China's criminal law, and thus,
it will help to gauge whether the media help the state carry out retribution and
project behavioral models outside the criminal contexts to which Durkheim and
Foucault described.
Why two samples for each area of law? The two samples from each legal
topic were published about twelve years apart. This time gap strengthens
conclusions about the role of media transmissions in China's legal system because
it rules out some of the risk of idiosyncrasies that arises when a single snapshot is
taken.
Family law in the PRC is comprised largely of the 1980 Marriage Law
(Hunyinfa), related regulations, and a lightly codified family planning program.1 61
Michael Palmer has persuasively argued that newspapers play an important role in
the formation and dissemination of family law in the PRC 1 62 It is important to
stress, however, that newspapers and other media transcend the function of
vehicles for the texts of enacted law.
The Xinhua news agency publishes articles in the "big newspapers" about
marriage, single life, and family planning. 163 Media transmissions about family in
the PRC project images of family relationships and relations between the state and
159. See Lee, supra note 1, at 208-212.
160. See Michael Palmer, The Re-Emergence of Family law in Post-Mao China: Marriage, Divorce
and Reproduction, 1995 CHINA Q. 110, 125 (1995).
161. Id. at 111- 13 (1995); Michael Palmer, The People's Republic of China: More Rules But Less
Law, 29 J. FAM. L. 325, 327 (1990-1991).
162. Michael Palmer, The People's Republic of China: More Rules But Less Law, 29 J. FAM. L.
325, 325, 328, 334 n.40, 337 (1990-1991).
163. For example, F.B.I.S. Reports in June and July of 1984 included a few press stories on singles
over 30 years old and marriage.
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families that illustrate good behavior and bad behavior in situations that arc
regulated by central law and policy. These images are as important a part of the
government's message to the subjects of the law as are the texts of the laws
themselves, many of which are not published, particularly in the case of family
planning directives.
A. Family Planning
From January through July of 1984, by far the majority of the articles on
family matters collected by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service focused on
family planning. These articles often used a government meeting or speech, or the
issuance of a Party circular as the pretext for a fervent pitch to both government
officials and "the masses" to add more energy to their implementation of birth
quotas. The language was the familiar vocabulary developed by the Party in the
days of civil war campaigns, one that mixed military concepts with Soviet-style
teleology: the "masses" had to be "mobilized," "family planning work" in the
provinces was "arduous" though "progressing," the provinces and "departments at
all levels" were "called" to "add to achievements ... and make new contributions
to continuous, vigorous, and better fulfillment" of the family planning program164
Assessments of the program did not mention the already noticeable worsening of
China's traditional phenomenon of widespread killing of female fetuses and
infants. 165
164. See, e.g., National Family Planning Meeting Ends 7 Mar, F.B.I.S., Mar. 12, 1984, at K20
(translation into English of Xinhua Domestic Service report, Mar. 7, 1984 (China)) (on file with
author); Family Planning Commission Notes Fewer Births, F.B.I.S., Mar. 8, 1984, at K19, transcription
of Xinhua report in English, Mar. 7, 1984 (on file with author); Qinghai Reports Success in Family
Planning, F.B.I.S. (translation into English, Mar. 5, 1984, at T3, of Qinghai Provincial Service report,
Mar. 3, 1984 (China)) (on file with author); Hunan Reports Success in Family Planning, F.B.I.S.
(translation into English, Jan. 26, 1984, at P2, of Hunan Provincial Service report, Jan. 24, 1984
(China)) (on file with author); Hebei Holds Conference on Family Planning Work, F.B.I.S., Jan. 20,
1984 (on file with author); Hainan Circular Stresses Family Planning, F.B.I.S. (translation into
English, Mar. 22, 1984, at 2, Hainan Island Service, Mar. 20, 1984 (China)) (on file with author);
Shanxi Holds Public Health, Family Planning Meet, F.B.I.S. Jan. 3, 1984, at R3-R4 (translation into
English of Shanxi Provincial Service report, Dec. 30, 1983 (China)) (on file with author); Urumqi PLA
Holds Family Planning Meeting, F.B.I.S., Jan. 4, 1984, at T4 (translation into English of Urumqi
Xinjiang Regional Service Report, Jan. 2, 1984 (China)) (on file with author); Yunnan Family Planning
Work Plan Announced, F.B.I.S., Jan. 19, 1984, at Q1-Q3 (translation into English of Yunnan Provincial
Service report, Jan. 19, 1984 (China)) (on file with author); Shaanxi Holds Conference on Family
Planning Work, F.B.I.S., Jan. 24, 1984, at T2-T3 (translation into English of Shaanxi Provincial Service
report. Jan. 17, 1984 (China)) (on file with author).
165. See, e.g., National Family Planning Meeting Ends 7 Mar, F.B.I.S., Mar. 12, 1984, at K20
(translation into English of Xinhua Domestic Service report, Mar. 7, 1984 (China)) (on file with
author): Family Planning Commission Notes Fewer Births, F.B.I.S., Mar. 8, 1984, at K19, transcription
of Xinhua report in English, Mar. 7, 1984 (on file with author); Qinghai Reports Success in Family
Planning, F.B.I.S. (translation into English, Mar. 5, 1984, at T3, of Qinghai Provincial Service report,
Mar. 3, 1984 (China)) (on file with author); Hunan Reports Success in Family Planning, F.B.I.S.
(translation into English, Jan. 26, 1984, at P2, of Hunan Provincial Service report, Jan. 24, 1984
(China)) (on file with author); Hebei Holds Conference on Family Planning Work, F.B.I.S., Jan. 20,
1984 (on file with author); Hainan Circular Stresses Family Planning, F.B.I.S. (translation into
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Twelve years later, the transmission of images of compliance with the family
planning program continued to use official reports, rules, and announcements as
the ostensible newsworthy item, from which flowed the vocabulary of military
campaigns and Soviet-style production targets about the program in general.
166
One title of a People's Daily article discussing rates of population growth
contained the stirring slogan "Carry Forward the Cause, Forge Ahead Into the
Future, Perform Feats Again." 167 An event that generated a great deal of press
coverage was the "Chinese Population Award," a sum of 20,000 yuan, a medal,
and a certificate that the State Council awarded to ten "winners.' ' 168 The recipients
were government enforcers of the birth quotas who had achieved "success" in their
"work."' 169 First presented in 1993, this was "China's highest award in the field of
population and family planning,"'' 70 and a commentator noted that at that time, they
"had a very positive impact at home and abroad.' 7 1 More statistics were reported,
but in offering interpretations of the statistics, the side effects of the widespread
preference for male offspring went unmentioned, as in 1984. Evaluations of the
statistics were relatively simplistic, bespeaking either "success" or "failure."'
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English, Mar. 22, 1984, at 2, Hainan Island Service, Mar. 20, 1984 (China)) (on file with author);
Shanxi Holds Public Health, Family Planning Meet, F.B.I.S. Jan. 3, 1984, at R3-R4 (translation into
English of Shanxi Provincial Service report, Dec. 30, 1983 (China)) (on file with author); Urumqi PLA
Holds Family Planning Meeting, F.B.I.S., Jan. 4, 1984, at T4 (translation into English of Urumqi
Xinjiang Regional Service Report, Jan. 2, 1984 (China)) (on file with author); Yunnan Family Planning
Work Plan Announced, F.B.I.S., Jan. 19, 1984, at Q1-Q3 (translation into English of Yunnan Provincial
Service report, Jan. 19, 1984 (China)) (on file with author); Shaanxi Holds Conference on Family
Planning Work, F.B.I.S., Jan. 24, 1984, at T2-T3 (translation into English of Shaanxi Provincial Service
report, Jan. 17, 1984 (China)) (on file with author).
166. See, e.g., Gu Yining, Zhejiang Population Control Achievements Affirmed, ZHEJIANG RIBAO
[ZHEJIANG DAILY], Feb. 1, 1996, at I (China) (on file with author); Hebei Issues Family Planning
Regulations, HEBEI RIBAO [HEBEI DAILY], Feb. 22, 1996 (China) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Hebei]; Qinghai Releases 1995 Statistical Communique, QINGHAI RIBAO [QUINGHAI DAILY], Feb. 16,
1996 (China) (on file with author) [hereinafter Qinghai]; Yang Ximing & Song Youping, Wang Maolin
Addresses Family Planning Meeting, HUNAN RIBAO [HUNAN DAILY], Dec. 31, 1996, at I (China) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Wang Maolin]; Family Planning Long-Term State Policy (Xinhua
broadcast Feb. 9, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Family Planning]; Li Peng on Population
Control, Environmental Protection (Xinhua broadcast Mar. 5, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Li
Peng].
167. Commentator Hails 'Chinese Population Awards', RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Feb. 9,
1996, at 5 (China) [hereinafter Awards] (reporting a discussed proposal for formulating the 9th Five-
Year Plan and the long-term targets for the year 2010 where the goal is to bring the population below
1.3 billion in the year 2000 and below 1.4 billion in 2010) (on file with author).
168. Ai Xiao, 'Chinese Population Awards' Ceremony Reported, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], Feb. 9, 1996, at 5 (China) (on file with author); Family Planning, supra note 166.
169. See Ai Xiao, supra note 168; Family Planning, supra note 166.
170. Ai Xiao, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. For reports of "successes" at the provincial level, see Gu Yining, supra note 166 (discussing
Zhejiang's successes in population control during the Eighth Five-Year Plan); Wang Maolin, supra note
166 (discussing Hunan Province's record during the Eighth Five-Year Plan: "[T]he number of babies
born decreased by 1,635,000 and the range of decrease in the birth rate ranked at the forefront among
other provinces and municipalities of the country.").
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For example, family planning was viewed as successful because of the slowdown
in the growth of population in Zhejiang, and because the percentage of planned
births went up.
173
For statistical reports which emphasize positive "achievements" at the national level, see Ai Xiao, supra
note 168 ("Peng Peiyun was pleased to report on marked results achieved in population and family
planning work during the Eighth-Five Year Plan: The population growth rate dropped from 14.39
percent in 1990 to a relatively low level in 1995, and the momentum of the entire country's overly rapid
population growth rate has been effectively brought under control."); Awards, supra note 167 ("Over
the past 20 years or more, China's population and family planning work has scored tremendous
achievements which have been universally recognized. . [P]arty committees and governments at all
levels and a vast number of cadres and the masses painstakingly attained marked results in population
and family planning work; completed the population plan in a better way; achieved a steady decrease in
birth rate "); Census Indicates Population Growth Slowing (Xinhua broadcast Feb. 14, 1996)
(viewed by author) (reporting State Statistical Bureau data that the P.R.C.'s population growth slowed
"to an annual rate of 1.21 percent during the past five years" which was "0.34 percentage points less
than in the previous five years").
Ethnic minorities and migrants were linked to the major "failures of the one-child policy." A report
made public by the State Statistical Bureau sounded a pessimistic note when it concluded that the
population of ethnic minorities grew more quickly. For reports of the "failures," see Urban Problems
Created by Floating Population, LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK], Nov. 27, 1995, at 20-23 (China) (on file with
author) (discussing how the difficulties of monitoring changes in the size of families of migrants
complicated the "work" of "administrative leaders" to "control" the growth of the "floating population"
of migrants which and "impaired enforcement of the planned parenthood policy"); Xie Kang & Zhang
Hongchang, Shanxi Survey Shows One Child Policy Not Working, RENKOU YANJIU [POPULATION
RESEARCH], Sept. 29, 1995, at 72-73 (China) (on file with author) (discussing village survey in Shanxi
province that revealed 72.3 percent of women between the ages of 20 and 40 had two or more children
each and that the failure of the population program was related to peer pressure and fear of loss of
security in old age discussing a survey conducted in February, 1995, which revealed a reproductive
profile for women ages 20-40 in Xiejiaying village in Shanxi province. 72.3 percent had two or more
children each. The report concluded that the failure of the population program was related to peer
pressure and fear of loss of security in old age. There was no mention of a desire for sons as a cause of
the failure.).
173. Gu Yining, supra note 166.
For reports of "successes" at the provincial level, see PRC: Zhejiang Population Control Achievements
Affirmed, FBIS-CHI-96-037, Feb. 23, 1996, at 9 (translation into English of report by Gu Yining,
ZHEJIANG RIBAO [ZHEJIANG DAILY], Feb. 1, 1996, at I (China)) (on file with author); Wang Maolin
Addresses Family Planning Meeting, FBIS-CHI-96-015, Jan. 23, 1996, at 18, (translation into English
of report by Yang Ximing & Song Youping, Provincial Family Planning Meeting Puts Forward New
Trend of Thought for the Ninth Five-Year Plan, Dec. 31, 1995, at 1 (China)) (on file with author)
(discussing Hunan Province's record during the Eighth Five-Year Plan: "[The] number of babies born
decreased by 1,635,000 and the range of decrease in the birth rate ranked at the forefront among other
provinces and municipalities in the country.").
For statistical reports, which emphasize positive "'achievements" at the national level, see Census
Indicates Population Growth Slowing, FBIS-CHI-96-032, Feb. 1, 1996 (translation of Xinhua report,
Feb. 14, 1996 (China) (on file with author) (The national population growth of the PRC slowed to an
annual rate of 1.21 percent during the previous five years. The rate held steady at 1.55 percent in the
preceding five years)); PRC: 'Chinese Population Awards' Ceremony Reported, FBIS-CHI-96-037,
Feb. 23, 1996, at 9 (translation into English of report by Ai Xiao, The Second 'Chinese Population
Awards' Presented, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Feb. 9, 1996, at 5 (China) (on file with author)
("Peng Peiyun was pleased to report on marked results achieved in population and family planning
work during the Eighth Five-Year Plan: The population growth rate dropped from 14.39 percent in
1990 to a relatively low level in 1995, and the momentum of the entire country's overly rapid
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Mixed in with the rhetoric of campaigns and statistical goals were new images
that highlighted economic growth and the standard of living as reasons for
complying with the family planning program.114 One Xinhua report began with the
population growth rate has been effectively brought under control.")). See also, PRC: Commentator
Hails 'Chinese Population Awards', FBIS-CHI-96-037, Feb. 23, 1996, at 10 (translation into English of
report entitled, Carry Forward the Cause, Forge Ahead Into the Future, Perform Feats Again--
Congratulating Presentation of Second 'Chinese Population Awards', RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], Feb. 9, 1996, at 5 (China) (on file with author) ("Over the past 20 years or more, China's
population and family planning has scored tremendous achievements which have been universally
recognized .... [P]arty committees and governments at all levels and a vast number of cadres and the
masses painstakingly attained marked results in population and family planning work; completed the
population plan in a better way, achieved a steady decrease in the birth rate.").
Ethnic minorities and migrants were linked to the major "failures" of the one-child policy. A report
made public by the State Statistical Bureau sounded a pessimistic note when it concluded that the
population of ethnic minorities grew more quickly. PRC: Shanxi Survey Shows One Child Policy Not
Working, FBIS-CHI-96-032, Feb. 15, 1996, at 14-15 (translation into English of report by Xie Kang of
the Population and Employment Statistics Office of the State Statistics Bureau, with Zhang Hongchang
of the Population Institute at China People's University, One Child Policy Not Working in Two Villages,
RENKOU YANJIU [POPULATION RESEARCH], Sept. 29, 1994, at 72-73 (China) (on file with author)
(discussing a survey conducted in February, 1995, which revealed a reproductive profile of women ages
20-40 in Xie Jiaying village in Shanxi province. 75 percent had 2 or more children each. The failure of
the population program was related to peer pressure and fear of loss of security in old age, the report
concluded. No mention of a desire for sons as a cause of the failure.)); PRC Urban Problems Created
by Floating Population, FBIS-CHI-96-029, Feb. 12, 1996, at 20, 23 (translation into English of report
entitled Thoughts That the Congregation of Migrants From Elsewhere in the Country Evoke,
LIAOWANG, Nov. 27, 1995, at 20 (China) (on file with author) (Difficulties of monitoring changes in
the size of families of migrants complicated the "work" of "administrative leaders" to "control" the
growth of the "floating population" and "impaired enforcement of the planned parenthood policy.").
174. See e.g., Awards, supra note 167 ("The population problem is in essence a question of
development. China has a big base population figure and high population growth rate, which results in
relatively inadequate per-capita resources. . Contradictions among population, farmland, food,
resources, and environment will be sharper. Without strict population control or improvement in
population quality, it will be impossible to realize population growth in coordination with that of the
economy, society, resources, and environment; still less can sustained, rapid, and healthy national
economic development or social progress be achieved."); Bian Qingguo, Declining Role of Village
Committees in Population Control Work, RENKOU YU JINGJI [POPULATION AND ECONOMICS], Sept. 25,
1995, at 33-35 (China) (on file with author) (stating that village committees should help convey and
emphasize the economic reasons, for population control such as "per capita income" and "national
consumption, for family planning"); Family Planning, supra note 168 ("The family planning program is
intended ... to enhance the quality of the nation's life and it should be integrated with work to improve
living standards "); PRC: Family Planning Long-Term State Policy, FBIS-CHI-96-028, Feb. 9,
1996, at 37 (transcription of Xinhua report, Feb. 9, 1996 (China)) (on file with author) ("The family
planning program is intended ... to enhance the quality of the nation's life and it should be integrated
with work to improve living standards ....")); PRC: Commentator Hails 'Chinese Population Awards',
FBIS-CHI-96-037, Feb. 23, 1996, at 10 (translation into English of article entitled Carry Forward the
Cause, Forge Ahead Into the Future, Perform Feats Again--Congratulating Presentation of Second
'Chinese Population Awards', RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Feb. 9, 1996, at 5 (China) (on file
with author) ("The population problem is in essence a question of development. China has a big base
population figure and high population growth rate, which results in relatively inadequate per-capita
resources Contradictions among population, farmland, food, resources, and environment will be
sharper. Without strict population control or improvement in population quality, it will be impossible to
realize population growth in coordination with that of the economy, society, resources, and
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statement of a grocery store owner in Guangdong Province: "'I don't want to have
a son as long as I can earn enough money."" 175 The change in his attitude toward
family planning was attributed to a new mechanism for implementing the one-
child policy: the local and city family planning associations or committees
provided capital and labor to families who abided by the local birth quotas so that
the obedient families could start businesses, which would later become profitable
enough for the families to buy pensions from the state. 176 The opportunity to
purchase pensions alleviated a concern about security in old age, a major barrier to
limiting births. 77  Xinhua reported that Peng Peiyun, a State Councilor and
Minister of the State Family Planning Commission, made remarks in Beijing when
she presented the second-ever "Chinese Population Awards."' 78 She explained that
the larger goals of the family planning program were to raise the status of women,
meet economic targets, slow down population growth, and raise the quality of
life-goals that incidentally provided positive incentives for people in every family
in the PRC to comply with the program. 79 To emphasize the economic benefits of
the program, Peng stated: "The final goal is to co-ordinate population development
with sustainable development of economic, social and natural resources .... 180
Furthermore,
The purpose of instituting this award was to increase the entire society's
awareness of population and the concept of developing population in
coordination with economy and society; arouse a broad spectrum of
actual workers and scientific workers in the field of population and
family planning to have a sense of honor and mission and a spirit of
dedication; and mobilize the initiative of all relevant departments and
social organizations in tackling the population problem in a
comprehensive way. 181
environment; still less can sustained, rapid, and healthy national economic development or social
progress be achieved."); PRC: Declining Role of Village Committee in Population Work, FBIS-CHI-96-
032, Feb. 15, 1996, at 15-17 (translation into English of report by Bian Qingguo of the Hangzhou City
Family Planning Commission in Zhejiang Province, Declining Role of Village Committees in
Population Control Work, RENKOU YU JINGJI [POPULATION AND ECONOMY], Sept. 25, 1995, at 33-35
(China) (on file with author) (Village committees should help convey and emphasize the economic
reasons, such as "per capita income" and "national consumption," for family planning).
175. Local PRC Family Planning Groups Seen Breaking Barriers (Xinhua broadcast Jan. 18, 1996)
(viewed by author).
176. Id.
177. Id.; Local PRC Family Planning Groups Seen Breaking Barriers, FBIS-CHI-96-014, Jan. 22,
1996, at 26 (transcription of Xinhua report in English, Jan. 18, 1996 (China)) (on file with author).
178. Ai Xiao, supra note 168; Family Planning, supra note 166.
179. Family Planning, supra note 166.
180. Id.; PRC: Family Planning Longterm State Policy, FBIS-CHI-96-028, Feb. 9, 1996, at 37
(transcription of Xinhua report in English, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Feb. 9, 1996 (China)) (on
file with author).
181. Ai Xiao, supra note 168; PRC: 'Chinese Population Awards' Ceremony Reported, FBIS-CHI-
96-037, Feb. 23, 1996, at 9 (translation into English of report by Ai Xiao, The Second 'Chinese
Population Awards' Presented, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Feb. 9, 1996, at 5 (China)) (on file
with author).
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In the mid-1990s, the emphasis on economic incentives flowed from the
central administration not just to the public, but also to all government officials
through internal channels of the state-run media. The central government's State
Family Planning Commission's Policy and Law Department publishes treatises for
use by government officials only, as does the Family Planning Commission of the
Party propaganda department of each provincial government. Such treatises in
1993 and 1995 contained major policy announcements and statistical reports by
leading officials and recent cases of enforcement of birth quotas, each written by
-reporters" from either the propaganda department or from Xinhua news agency.' 82
Of the nineteen articles from the legal newspapers in this sample, only two
addressed the family-planning policy. In one, the statistics on the results of
implementing district birth quotas were presented in the form of a travelogue
through Sichuan province: on October 15 the reporter arrives at the "first stop" of
his tour, a district whose demography, living standards, and history with family
planning he describes.1 83 In the afternoon of October 17, he arrives at another
district that he describes in similar terms, and so on, until he has covered four
districts. The article discussed the experimentation in selected places of the "Three
Unities" policy, which was encapsulated in the slogan: "The party and the
government are responsible for directing the path, one enterprise put first takes the
first step, relevant departments take it by the hand and help, few births make for
outstanding family planning, happiness, and prosperity" (Dangzheng fuze zhilu,
yiye weizhu qibu, bumen xieshou bangzhu, shaoshengyouyu kuaifu)1 84 The slogan
and the quotas associated with it in Sichuan were designed to combine the family
planning policy with economic policy and with spiritual enrichment. The theme
throughout the article was that through hard and persistent "work" on limiting
births, the people of Sichuan were raising their living standards and ensuring a
peaceful, happy, cultured, and prosperous future for themselves.18 5 The other
article described in greater depth the "Three Unities" policy. 186 The policy was
described as "a new compass and a new path for family planning work," and as
having been derived from a Marxist perspective that was holistic in its combined
stress on "social life, government life, and spiritual life."'
' 87
182. See, e.g., SHAOSHENG KUAIFU XINGFU ZHILU [THE ROAD OF FEWER BIRTHS SPEED
PROSPERITY AND HAPPINESS] (Beijing: State Family Planning Commission, Policy and Law
Department, 1993) (on file with author); HAO XINWEN, 1991-1994 [GOOD NEWS, 1991-1994],
(Zhengzhou: Chinese Communist Party Henan Province Propaganda Department, Henan Province
Family Planning Commission, 1995) [hereinafter GOOD NEWS, 199 1-1994].
183. Li Jia, Zouxiang wenming fuyu zhilu--sichuansheng jihua shengyu gongzuo caifang zhaji
[Walking the Road Toward Civilization and Prosperity--Notes From Covering the Family Planning
Work in Sichuan Province], FAZHI RBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Nov. 21, 1995, at 5 (China) (on file
with author).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Li Chunmin, Xiwang zhilou [The Wished For Path], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY],
Nov. 21, 1995, at 5 (China) (on file with author).
187. Id.
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How did these transmissions aim to facilitate the enforcement of the family
planning policy? None of the transmissions on family planning depicted the
punishment of a failure to comply with the policy, and thus did not invite its
readers into a Durkheimian catharsis. Instead, the transmissions highlighted
examples of compliance and held those up as models for the rest of society. The
theme of coerced compliance sounded only obliquely evoked by the frequent use
of the imagery of self-discipline and surveillance, incarnations of coercion
according to Foucault, and of "work" and production targets, markers of state-
sponsored violence, according to Nagengast. True to Foucault's framework of
relations between state and society, the ideal promoted by the transmissions was
one where top officials encourage low-level officials to discipline themselves to
enforce the birth quotas with vigor, the low-level officials inspire the people to
discipline themselves to comply with the birth quotas, and the people encourage
their local leaders to remain vigilant in their surveillance of compliance with the
birth quotas. "Failure" occurred when monitoring of migratory populations proved
difficult. This is an ideal where everyone's procreation plans are watched,
detected, and known. The emphasis on the positive incentive to improve one's
standard of living played upon widespread fears of being left behind in the rush to
amass wealth in the 1980s and 1990s and, therefore, contained an implicit threat of
impoverishment for failure to limit the births in one's family.
B. The Marriage Law
In contrast to the family planning transmissions, a Durkheimian catharsis
seemed to be the point of many of the transmissions pertaining to the 1980
Marriage Law. Several articles projected a Durkheimian vision of the state as the
upholder of the values cherished by society. Four of the nineteen articles in the
Legal System Daily focused on the statute, two of which appeared in a regular
column entitled "Informal Discussions About the Marriage Law" (Hunyin fa
mantan)1 88  A message common to some of these articles was that the 1980
Marriage Law protects women, children, and the elderly from harm when they are
most vulnerable. In some, the law is portrayed as protective without any resort to
punishment. One article addressed the question of whether married couples could
divorce while expecting a child.189 The article followed a format that went from
the general to the detailed. It began with the quotation of the text of the provision
of the Marriage Law that prohibits divorce during pregnancy and the first year of
the child's life, and a general explanation of that rule. 190 Following this were
188. Chen Fengzhi & Yan Fei, Hunyinfa mantan: Zhei duijing chenglijiehun defugi weihe bei pan
zhonghunzui? [Informal Discussions About the Marriage Law: Why Did the Judge Declare as
Bigamists This Couple That Registered Their Marriage?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Dec.
3, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bigamists]; Zheng Jing, Hunyinfa mantan: yunfu,
chanfu de teshu falu, [Informal Discussions About the Marriage Law: Concerning the Special Legal
Protection of Pregnant and Nursing Women], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Sept. 10, 1995, at
5 (China) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pregnant and Nursing Women].
189. Pregnant and Nursing Women, supra note 188 (discussing article 27 of the 1980 Marriage
Law, which prohibits divorce when the wife is pregnant and during the year after she gives birth).
190. Id.
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several hypotheticals that raised detailed and difficult questions about the judicial
application of that rule.191 This was not a discussion of the policy ramifications of
the rule. For example, there was no mention about why judicial protection of
women's financial support did not extend to single mothers or mothers of infants
and young children. The message was that the law provides for benevolent
interference by the state in marriages in situations where the wife is deemed to be
especially vulnerable to harm. The law appears to care enough about these women
to offer a judicial way out of divorces that they do not want.1 92 Thus, the law
embodies the values presumed to be cherished by society, and offers people a
procedure for triggering interference by the state to uphold those values.
The Marriage Law is part of a larger policy of the PRC government to divert
the purposes of marriage toward the strengthening of the government, the
maximizing of the self-sufficiency, and the cohesiveness of the family, in order to
minimize the government's welfare obligations.1 93 Three of the legal newspaper
articles in the sample that did not mention the Marriage Law lauded the merits of
the state-sponsored matchmaking centers, one of the Party's programs for
implementing its larger policy on families. Adopting the format of a report on the
work of the centers, one such article highlighted the contrast between the
matchmaking centers and the businesses springing up throughout China's major
cities by describing the centers as "serving the masses." 194 The government thus
191. Id.
192. Zheng Jing, Hunyinfa mantan: yunfu, chanfu de teshufalu, [An Informal Discussion About the
Marriage Law: Concerning the Special Legal Protection of Pregnant and Nursing Women], FAZHI
RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Sept. 10, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with author) (discussing article 27
of the 1980 Marriage Law, which prohibits divorce when the wife is pregnant and during the year after
she gives birth).
193. See Michael Palmer, The Re-emergence of Family Law in Post-Mao China: Marriage,
Divorce, and Reproduction, 141 CHINA Q. 110, 110, 113, 115-16 (1995) [hereinafter Re-emergence of
Family Law]. Palmer explains that the "rapid codification of family law" was due to Party
"leadership's concern to ensure stability, order" and to place family as the "basic unit of social life."
The various Marriage Law provisions shaped the Chinese family in order to make it more consistent
with "new economic and social orders." The Marriage Law links sexual conduct with marriage, thus
making marriage is the only legally permissible way to reproduce. Additionally, the Marriage Law
makes the family the "primary agent of socialization" and parents are expected to "pass on appropriate
social and culture values to their children . . . so that they become fully socialized members of Chinese
society." The Marriage Law also obligates PRC families with responsibility to care for the "elderly and
the infirm.' Id. at 110-116; see also Michael Palmer, The People's Republic of China: More Rules but
Less Law, 29 J. FAM. L. 325, 325-26 (1991) [hereinafter More Rules] (discussing the passage of new
family and marriage disciplinary regulations "designed to remedy the deviant conduct of party members
who violate norms of socialist morality" in light of Party attempts to urge the people to "emulate
socialist heroes such as Lei Feng" who devoted himself to "China, work, the people and the Party.");
Annelise Riles, Spheres of Exchange and Spheres of Law: Identity and Power in Chinese Marriage
Agreements, 19 INT'L J. Soc. L. 501, 507 (1991) (explaining that the Marriage Law of 1950 was created
to "abolish arranged marriages and attack the power of the lineages" and that the government "liberated
the citizen from the lineage system so that he or she may dedicate him or herself to the state, not so that
he or she may indulge in individualism").
194. Palmer argues that the matchmaking offices attempt to weaken the authority of the parents in
finding spouses for their children. More Rules, supra note 193 at 325-242; Re-emergence of Family
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stood for selfless service, a value which it assumed was cherished by society
despite the trend toward unscrupulous profit-making alluded to in the article.
Despite the good intentions portrayed in the press behind the government's
provision of matchmaking services, seeking marriage partners has become a risky
affair in the PRC, according to two of the other articles in the sample.' 95 One
recounted a story about two women who ran a scam by asking for loans from
people they met through the matchmaking centers and not repaying them. 96 One
of the women got ten years in prison, the other got six and a half years. 97 Another
article, written by a member of a village government in Henan province, described
the dangers of answering personal ads for marriage partners. 198 Personal ads began
to appear in 1981 with the advent of the advertizing industry in the PRC, and have
proliferated since then.199 In both articles, blame for the matchmaking scams is not
placed on the government who runs the only officially-approved matchmaking
program, but on greedy and unscrupulous women without an affiliation with the
government. The government matchmaking services were portrayed as valuable
and dependable if clients steered clear of women who rushed into financial
arrangements before marriage.
The state's assumption of the role of defender of deeply felt values also
appears in the articles that illustrate contraventions of the Marriage Law that
brought decisive punishment by the state. The Marriage Law requires that
marriages be registered with the local government where the couple lives. 200 One
article sent the message that marriage registration was such a serious matter that
even a delay in registering brought serious penal consequences. It described a
harsh court judgment against a young couple that lived together before registering
their marriage with the authorities, as required by the Marriage Law.20' The article
went through the facts of the case in order to explain why a six-month prison
sentence was the correct punishment for this couple.20 2 The couple fell in love
and, following local customs in their village, held a marriage ceremony and set up
house together.20 3 Their failure to register was discovered by a mediator to whom
they went for help in resolving a "contradiction" that developed in their
Law, supra note 193 at 142.
195. Wang Yusong & Hu Guiming, Zhenghun Pianhun Nu [The Woman Who Looks For Mates and
Swindles Them], FAZHI RIBAO ZHOUMO BAN [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY, WEEKEND EDITION], Mar. 15,
1996, at 7 (China) (on file with author); Gong Si, Liushen 'Zheng Hun' [Be Aware of Those Looking for
Mates], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Apr. 23, 1996, at 7 (China) (on file with author).
196. Wang Yusong & Hu Guiming, supra note 195.
197. Id.
198. Gong Si, supra note 195.
199. Id.
200. See Marriage Law of the People's Republic. of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981), art. 8 (China).
201. Bigamists, supra note 188, at 3.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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relationship. 204 About a month after they had resolved the problem, they registered
their marriage in the local government office.2 °5 The authors of the article cited
and quoted from three legal provisions that shed no light on the question of why
their act should be deemed a serious criminal offense.20 6  One of the provisions
cited, however, did support a finding that their marriage had no effect.
20 7
The author drew another conclusion from this provision, which was that the
couple "did not love protecting the law. ' '20 8 The implication was that the man and
woman should have desired, on their own, to uphold the law. This message places
on the reader the responsibility of registering his or her own marriage, and even
beyond this, of reporting failures to register out of a desire to see the law upheld.
It is an exhortation to self-discipline and surveillance a la Foucault, appearing
alongside the Durkheimian vision of the state as reinforcing society's values.
Other articles about the Marriage Law emphasized surveillance. Deviations
from requirements in the Marriage Law were portrayed as serious and shameful
and would be detected and addressed by a mediator from the local mediation
committee, a grass-roots organ of the state with a pyramid structure set up to keep
tabs on all family disputes, even those that families do not report. One such article
told a story about a ninety-year-old woman who had three sons, each of whom had
established a separate household. 20 9 For various reasons, the members of these
households would not allow her to live with any of them. A mediator from the
village mediation committee appeared while the family was gathered together and
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. See also Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Jul. 6, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980), art. 180 (China), available at
http://www.novexcn.com/criminallaw.html. Article 180 in the Criminal Law merely provided for a
maximum sentence of two years in prison for "serious marital offenses" committed with knowledge. An
undated Supreme People's Court opinion interpreting the 1986 Marriage Registration Measures, merely
stated the circular proposition that if a couple lives together without registering their marriage, and if
the masses regard them as married, and if one member of the couple sues for a divorce in the People's
Court, and if when they set up house both parties followed the marriage regulations, then the marriage
is valid; but if one or both people fail to abide by the Marriage Law when they set up house, then they
may be regarded as violating the Marriage Law. Bigamists, supra note 188, at 3.
208. Bigamists, supra note 188, at 3. See also Regulations on Control of Marriage Registration
(promulgated by the Ministry of Civ. Affairs, Feb. 1, 1994), art. 24 (China). A 1994 regulation issued
by the Minzhengbu provided that if a couple below the legal age for marriage sets up house together, or
if an otherwise legally eligible couple sets up house without registering a marriage, their marriage has
no effect and the couple "does not love protecting the law. Id.; Regulations on Control of Marriage
Registration (promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Feb. 1, 1994), art. 24 (China), available at
http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-07/29/content 18376.htm; Chen Fengzhi and Yan Fei, Hunyinfa
mantan: Zhei duijing chengji jiehun de fuqi weihe bei pan zhonghunzui? [Informal Discussions of the
Marriage Law: Why did the judge declare as bigamists this couple that registered their marriage?],
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Dec. 3, 1995, at 3. (China) (on file with author).
209. Yue Tangji, Fayujiating; jiehunfa 'xi le sanjia 'huo, '[The Marriage Law 'Extinguishes' the
Three Families 'Fire ], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY] Dec. 10, 1995, at 10 (China) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Three Families Fire].
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paraphrased to them, in simple language (and did not cite), a provision of the
Marriage Law which provided that children must care for their parents.21 ( Then
the mediator gently chastised them for failing to care for the woman, and all of
them hung their heads in shame and vowed to carry out their duty.211 Here the
message was, if you do not support your elderly relatives, the state will intrude and
shame you, but not punish you as a criminal if you restructure your household in
conformance with the law.
Some of the articles set up models, both negative and positive, to illustrate
central interpretations of provisions of the 1980 Marriage Law. The Marriage Law
regulates divorce, and the nine articles in the sample that treated issues related to
divorce relayed examples of unanticipated problems that plague divorcing couples.
Underlying all of the articles was the message that divorce is a nasty business and
raises lots of unanticipated problems. Only one of the articles attempted to put a
positive spin on the climbing divorce rate by speculating that the rate would not
prevent the typical Chinese family, in the twenty-first century, from having the
following ideal attributes: limited to four grandparents, two parents, and one child;
a stronger role for love in the selection of marriage partners; and higher quality
marriages.
212
Another type of article that used models to promote the government's policies
about the family was the personal advice article. Without mentioning the Marriage
Law, these models offered suggestions about how to deal with difficulties in
family relationships, such as what to do if your spouse does not share any of your
interests, 213 or what to do if you fall in love later in life.214 These articles were
lively and entertaining, and created a friendly image for the legal newspaper in
which they appeared. At the same time, they sent messages that supported the
policies that lay behind the Marriage Law. The preventative work and the repair to
family relationships that these articles aimed to illustrate was the type that would
help to keep three generations of a family together. Keeping this unit of a family
from breaking apart is imperative in the PRC today, with a shrinking pension
program, a shortage of housing space in the cities, and a shortage of arable land in
the countryside, which puts a premium on the cost of expanding housing there.
Urban dwellers with a decent education read the official legal newspapers, but
do media products with a broader distribution function differently? A sampling of
210. Id.; see also Marriage Law of the People's Rep. of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981), art. 21 (China), available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db= 1 &id=1793&keyword-marriage / 201aw.
211. Three Families Fire, supra note 209, at 3.
212. Chen Hong, Zhongguo jiating de zhoushi [Trends in Chinese Families], FAZHI R!BAO [LEGAL
SYSTEM DAILY] Dec. 31, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with author).
213. Su Dianyuan, Xingqu butong: Nengjiehe chengmei de kangli ma? [Different Interests: Can
Married Couples Be United?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY] Dec. 10, 1995, at 3 (China) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Different Interests].
214. Wu Ailing, Wanlian: Bu dengyu xinli biantai [Falling In Love Late in Life: Doesn't Mean
Mental Problems], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY] Oct. 1, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with
author).
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popular treatises on family law published between 1985 and 1992 suggests not.
The treatises are published by a variety of popular presses run by the Ministry of
Justice, one targeting the members of the PLA, one targeting the "masses," one for
women, and another targeting rural villages. These treatises use models of positive
behavior to promote the central government's policies. From the texts of all of
these treatises, it is apparent that their purpose was to reinforce a sense of the
sufficiency of the Marriage Law for solving routine problems related to
inheritance, property, and marriage encountered by ordinary families. On the other
hand, the statutory provisions that were cited never supplied the entire solution to
the family problems that are illustrated. The recommendations offered in two of
the treatises emphasized a common sense solution to each conflict recounted, with
the statutory rule, or even just a reference to the constitution's protection of the
freedom to marry or a simple invocation of the name of the Marriage Law, tacked
on at the end.2 15 Rather than offering a way to reason from the statutory provision
that provides the solution to these problems, then, the treatises offered official
models that needed to be internalized.2 16
Surveillance provided the subtext of some of the treatises. Another treatise
was a collection of letters from people in the countryside who had questions about
whether various activities of their neighbors complied with the law. 217 It was a sort
of "Dear Abby" for rural busybodies or those who might watch and report on their
neighbors in a modem-day incarnation of the baojia system. Although this book
reveals much about the creative ways in which villagers must try to evade the
positive family law enacted by the central government, the author presumes that
neighbors have the responsibility to help each other internalize the official
models.2 18
215. See GAO YAYUN, XIANDAI SHENGHUO FALU [THE MODERN LIVING LAW] (Beijing: Rural
Village Reading Materials Press eds., 1987) (on file with author); CHEN XINGBO, HUNVIN, JIATING,
CAICHAN JICHENG JIEYI [EXPLAINING MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND THE INHERITANCE OF PROPERTY]
(Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press eds., 1985) (on file with author). See also HUNYIN JIATING
JICHENG 90 WEN [90 QUESTIONS ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND INHERITANCE] (China Women's
Press eds., 1985); HuYiN JICHENG FA XINLUN [A NEW DISCUSSION OF THE MARRIAGE AND
INHERITANCE LAWS] (Beijing: The Masses Press eds., 1992) (on file with author); ZHANG XIAN,
HUNYIN RATING FALU CHANGSHI [COMMON KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE
LAWS] (Shanghai: Xuelin Press eds., 1988) (on file with author).
216. See GAO YAYUN, XIANDAI SHENGHUO FALU [THE MODERN LIVING LAW] (Beijing: Rural
Village Reading Materials Press eds., 1987) (on file with author); CHEN XINGBO, HUNVIN, RATING,
CAICHAN JICHENG JIEYI [EXPLAINING MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND THE INHERITANCE OF PROPERTY]
(Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press eds., 1985) (on file with author). See also HUNYIN JIATING
JICHENG 90 WEN [90 QUESTIONS ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND INHERITANCE] (China Women's
Press eds., 1985); HUYIN JICHENG FA XINLUN [A NEW DISCUSSION OF THE MARRIAGE AND
INHERITANCE LAWS] (Beijing: The Masses Press eds., 1992) (on file with author); ZHANG XIAN,
HUNYIN JIATING FALU CHANGSHI [COMMON KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE
LAWS] (Shanghai: Xuelin Press eds., 1988) (on file with author).
217. CHEN XINGBO, HUNVIN, JIATING, CAICHAN JICHENG JIEYI, supra note 216.
218. Id.
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C. The Continuing Role of Media in Family Law
Although people outside of the CCP are now permitted to create some media
transmissions, the system of family law in the PRC still involves a concerted effort
to disseminate through media channels officially acceptable interpretations of law
in a way that might induce the public to conform their behavior to them.
Commercialization appears to have enlivened and varied the formats of the "big
newspaper" articles, but not weakened the force with which they convey official
interpretations of family planning policy and the Marriage Law. From 1984 to
1996, the contents of the official press releases on family planning grew longer, a
signal of greater emphasis, and more varied, a signal of greater commercialization
and competition for readership. The samples from two legal newspapers from
September of 1995 through May of 1996 also conformed to a commercializing
trend. The articles that treated legal issues involving marriage, divorce,
procreation, and family life generally appeared on pages dedicated to family issues
and were made to look appealing with eye-grabbing headlines in varying fonts,
photos, drawings, and bold markers that labeled the broad topics of many of the
articles. Many of the pieces on these pages were soap-opera-like stories about the
twists and turns of family relationships. The formats of the nine pieces on divorce
were lively, most taking the form of stories219 or advice columns,220 and opening
with a provocative quotation or question. The contents varied from legal advice
about common issues that arose in divorce,22 1 to threats of prison sentences for
219. See, e.g., Xiao Min, Meng, bing buzongshiyuan de - guanyu lihunzu de gushi [Dreams Are
Not Always Plausible - Stories About Divorces], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY] May 12, 1996,
at 3 (China) (on file with author).
220. One example of an advice column is the "letter box of the barracks lawyer" [Junying lushi
xinxiang] column written by Li Mianju of the Sanzhou Military District Legal Advice Office. See, e.g.,
Li Mianju, Xianyijunren yaoqiu lihun, xuyao banli naxie shouxu? [Active Service Personnel Who Need
To Divorce, Which Procedures Do They Need to Follow?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Sept.
21, 1995, at 6 (China) (on file with author). Another example is the "Law enforcement and supervision
post", Zhifa jiandu gang column, which published a letter from a worker with the Beijing Municipal
Machine Industry Elementary School. The paper entitled the letter, an answer from the newspaper's
Masses Work Bureau, and an answer from the court involved in the person's story "Bugei 'zanzhu'
bupan lihun," [If you don't give 'assistance,' you don't get a divorce decree]. Bugei 'zanzhu' bupan
lihun [If You Don't Give 'Assistance, ' You Don't Get a Divorce Decree], FAZHI R1BAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], Apr. 25, 1996, at 8, (China) (on file with author) (describing how the president of the court in
which the person sought a divorce told her lawyer to give U.S. $5,000 in "assistance" to the court in
exchange for a divorce decree). For a third example, see Lihunhou yifang de sicunkun zenmo chul'?
[How To Manage One Side's Private Finances After Divorce], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY],
Dec. 10, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with author); Li Mianju, Xianyijunren yaoqiu lihun, xuyao banli
naxie shouxu? [Active Service Personnel Who Need to Divorce, Which Procedures Do They Need to
Follow?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Sept. 21, 1995, at 6 (China) (on file with author);
Bugei 'zanzhu' bupan lihun [If you don't give 'assistance,' you don't get a divorce decree], FAZHI
RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Apr. 25, 1996, at 8 (China) (on file with author); Lihunhou yifang de
sicunkun zenmo chuli? [How To Manage One Side's Private Finances After Divorce], FAZHI RIBAO
[LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Dec. 10, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with author).
221. See, e.g., Cheng Xiwei, Lihunshi zhaiwu shifo geban fudan [Is Debt After Divorce to be
Shouldered Equally?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Dec. 31, 1995, at 3 (China) (on file with
author) (giving advice about the legal obligation for debt after divorce, given in the form of a story
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falsifying divorce papers.222 Each legal newspaper article that discussed provisions
of the Marriage Law treated one discrete legal issue, but the format used to treat
each issue varied from article to article. The variations in format appear to be an
attempt to offer a range of depth in the treatment of the issues. While the quality
of legal analysis varied, the quality was independent from the format chosen. The
textual and hypothetical treatment of a legal provision mentioned above was less
lively than the articles that told stories.
This trend was not noticeable in the popular treatises on family law, but each
used a format that helped to propagate state policies in as palatable a way as
possible. One book contained 78 short fact patterns, each giving rise to a dispute
or a lawsuit.2 23 Each story was followed by an explanation of how the dispute or
lawsuit should be settled, then the relevant statutory provisions were quoted. The
format was straightforward, replicating a longstanding format for official court
documents, and the tone was lively.224 Another presented simple explanations to
22590 questions about legal issues of marriage, family, and inheritance. Yet another
published reports of the questionable practices of neighbors in their villages, such
as not getting marriage certificates, and answers that branded the practices
illegal.226
Despite the growing attention to entertaining formats, the transmissions
continued to send authoritative messages. The integration of economic incentives
into its models for conforming to the family planning policy echoed a general trend
in official policy to stress economics, and to separate economics from politics.
227
In fact, the role of the state-run media in disseminating official interpretations of
family grew between 1984 and 1996. The Party directed those in charge of its
media channels to vary the format in order to more effectively enforce the law. In
about the couple "Little Su" and "Ahnan"); Zhao Zhongyuan and Xu Genhua, Lihun hou: zinu xingshi
zhizheng, [After Divorce: The Battle Over the Childrens' Surname], SHANGHAI FAZHIBAO [SHANGHAI
LEGAL NEWS], May 10, 1996, at 1 (China) (on file with author) (featuring two stories which gave rise
to lawsuits and statistics about whether children keep their father's last name after their parents divorce
(32% did not in "recent" years), and a brief discussion of Article 16 of the Marriage Law which permits
the children to have the name of either parent after divorce); Hui Wen, Zuigao renminfayuanjiu lihun
anjian zhonggong fang shiyong, chengzu deng wenti zuo zhuanmen jueda [Supreme People's Court
Makes Use of State-Owned Housing in Divorce Case: Questions About Paying Rent, etc. Generate
Specialized Answers], SHANGHAI FAZHIBAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], May 6, 1996, at 4
(China) (on file with author) (presenting ten questions posed to the Supreme Court and containing
answers given by practicing judges based on "relevant regulations").
222. See, e.g., Zhong Yang & Lin Fa, Ta zUi panjue lihun, [He Gave Himself a Divorce Judgment],
FAZHI RIBAO, [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Sept. 29, 1995, at 6 (China) (on file with author) (containing a
story about a man in Shandong Province who received a three-year prison sentence for falsifying a
court document in order to obtain a divorce).
223. GAO YAYUN, XIANDAI SHENGHUO FALU, supra note 216.
224. See generally, id.
225. HUNYIN JIATING JICHENG 90 WEN, supra note 215.
226. HUNVIN, JIATING, CAICHAN JICHENG JIEYI, supra note 216.
227. Tahirih V. Lee, The Future of Federalism in China, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN
CHINA 271, 294-95 (Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman & R. Kent Guy eds., 2000).
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1995, the head of Henan Province's Propaganda Department wrote in an internal
publication that a major change in the inculcation of a consciousness of the family
planning policy to the masses was the use of multiple formats, including news
dispatches, political opinions and commentaries, radio broadcasts of special visits
and televised broadcasts of special topics, on-the-scene reporting, and short
newsworthy stories.228
The proliferation of electronic formats for media transmissions in China does
not change the role that such transmissions play in the legal system there.
Government-run websites and blogs disseminate the laws and official
interpretations of the laws. Just as the print and broadcast media aimed to attract
readers by using lively formats, internet-based media use visually and aurally
stimulating devices, such as cartoons, and interactivity to draw in readers.
CONCLUSION
In the PRC, media transmissions about matters that are regulated by law are
an integral part of the legal system. The samples of media transmissions about
family law functioned as a coordinated part of a central program to enforce a range
of laws, from the largely un-codified one-child policy, to the codified and
periodically amended Marriage Law. The official publicity surrounding the one-
child policy and the 1980 Marriage Law steadily has worked to establish the
acceptance of and compliance with these programs.
The frameworks offered by Durkheim and Foucault-Epstein-Nagengast help
to explain how media transmissions function in the legal system of the PRC. The
media sent messages that evoked values that might unify the audience with the
PRC central government in a way symptomatic of Durkheim's vision of state and
society. The positive spin put on the economic incentives for complying with
family law attempted to communicate positive models for behavior in a fashion
similar to that identified by Foucault in his vision of state and society. This
language lauds discipline and hard work, and attaches these qualities to the state.
The suggestion of negative consequences if the models were not complied with,
and the portrayal as "work" of the central government, drives in family law,
according to Foucault, Epstein, and Nagengast, the signal that compliance with the
law, if not done voluntarily, will be forced.
As powerful as their explanatory power is, however, these frameworks do not
shed light on all the facets of the relationship between media and law in China.
Durkheim's government as keeper of societal values and Foucault's government as
disciplinarian, do not fully capture the paternalistic self-image projected by
China's rulers to its subjects for centuries. Recall the two types of messages sent
in the articles about the Marriage Law. In one, the statute protected relatively
defenseless people when they were most vulnerable to harm,229 and in the other,
228. GOOD NEWS: 1991-1994, supra note 182, at 2.
229. See, e.g., Pregnant and Nursing Women, supra note 188, at 3; Different Interests, supra note
213.
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failure to comply with the Marriage Law would be detected, and if not then
corrected, harshly punished.230  Taken together, both types of messages
communicated a parental image of the government: caring and protective,23' yet
strict and harsh when disobeyed.232 The parental image of the PRC government
echoes the paternalism of Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, which he fostered in his
public communications.233 The use of media to instill in the public the models of
the central ruler has deep roots in Chinese history. It has been a feature of
government since at least the founding of the Ming Dynasty about 650 years ago,
and was refined and expanded by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party.
To an extent, media transmissions in the PRC function as sources of law.
Each item in the samples studied here filled in a gap in the formal law. Emanating
from the same authority as enacted laws, these transmissions were authoritative in
much the same way, despite their lesser status. The importance of the
transmissions varied, depending on where in the publication they were placed and
how bold was the typeface, but such a spectrum of importance for media
transmissions about law does not mandate against their status or function as
sources of law. On the contrary, it fits them within the sources of law in the PRC,
which, as in many European countries, are officially recognized to vary along a
spectrum of authoritativeness. Under the coordinated system of Party policy-
making and judicial supervision, the media transmissions of stories and
interpretations of the law rank second only to Supreme People's Court opinions
that lawyers without Party connections can get to, which are official sources of law
that bind judges.
The trend toward entertainment in the official media did not seem to
necessitate a loosening of state control over the messages sent. The Party-run
Xinhua news agency and the major legal newspaper continued to send the same
types of messages about how the enforcers of the family laws and policies should
do their work and how individuals should voluntarily comply with the law and
encourage others to comply. Over the same period, the family planning
transmissions increased their stress on economic incentives. Despite the enhanced
appeal of the vehicle, the pervasiveness of economic incentives in the newer
samples confirms that the official media did not stray from Party policy, which
showed increasing stress on economic incentives in other areas of law.
The similarity between official messages about law and the legal themes
treated in popular films further supports the possibility that some popular legal
education is shifting to the "private" sector. Several films that were popular in the
PRC in the 1990s sent official messages about law. In "Qiu Ju Goes To Court,',234
230. See Bigamists, supra note 188, at 3.
231. Two examples were Pregnant and Nursing Women, supra note 188; Different Interests, supra
note 213.
232. For example, see Bigamists, supra note 188.
233. FARMER, supra note 3, at 103-07.
234. THE STORY OF QIU JU, (Sony Pictures Classics 1993) (directed by Zhang yimou) (viewed by
author).
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the system of administrative litigation proves to be fair but ill suited to the
management of permanent personal relationships in the countryside.23 5 Qiu Ju is a
peasant woman who deeply feels that the village head has dealt her family an
injustice, but her aggressive pursuit of justice through higher officials and courts
ends in the defeat of not one, but two, ultimately likeable and decent officials who
are friends of her family.
This caution against the use of litigation to solve problems in personal
relationships figures prominently in the official media. For example, a television
drama about a peasant family in northern China showed a grandmother's utter
horror when she learned that a family dispute was going to court.236 She acted as if
the end of her life and her family's fortunes were in sight. She refused to eat,
walked the long distance to the People's Tribunal (renmin fating), and threw
herself on the doorstep of the outer office inhabited by two public security officers.
She wailed and pleaded that they not send her family to jail. When the family
appeared in court, she sat among the plaintiffs, but did not speak. Pleasant and
fair-minded people staffed the court. After hearing five people speak, the judge, a
female public security officer, asked if they wanted mediation. The defendants all
cried "yes," while the plaintiffs cried and said nothing. The judge then dismissed
the case and everyone joined in the crying, including the three tough male
defendants. At this point, the grandmother spoke, announcing that the family
could find a way to reunite.237
Echoing a theme from the official legal newspapers, director Huang Jianxin
uses his film "Signal Left, Turn Right," which premiered in 1996, to criticize
women who use their sexuality to enrich themselves financially.238 All but one of
the women portrayed in the film are preoccupied with money, and all of the
women lack stable and dependable relationships with men who could provide for
them. The wife of the driving instructor obsesses over the family finances and
waits at home for her husband to bring her his cash earnings from work, which she
hungrily counts while leaving her young son to play with her husband. When a
wealthy entrepreneur gives an expensive pooch to Yang Wei, a driving school
student whose husband recently had left her and her young son penniless, Yang
Wei sells the pet for a wad of cash even after her son grows strongly attached to it.
A woman who runs a restaurant greedily pockets hundreds of yuan in a scam she
devised with the driving instructor to lure his students into her restaurant and
saddle them with an inflated lunch tab.
Like the legal press accounts of women who con cash out of men who use the
government's marriage brokers, Huang's criticism of women who trade idealism
for money, as he puts it, is simplistic and does not plumb the depths of this issue.
Neither his film nor the legal newspapers explore the sources of their financial
235. See id.
236. Shanghai broadcast June 22, 1993 (viewed by the author).
237. Id.
238. DA ZUO DENG XIANG YOU ZHUAN [SIGNAL LEFT, TURN RIGHT] (1996) (on file with author).
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
insecurity and anxiety, nor dwell on the societal trends which are pushing women
into these kinds of compromising situations in such numbers that a new saying has
been coined to describe it: "Rich men become corrupt; corrupt women become
rich. ,
239
But if films created outside the Party propaganda apparatus are reinforcing
some of the Party's policies on law, they may be offering additional views of legal
issues that are more complex, and even contrary to official policy. In "Qiu Ju
Goes To Court," Zhang Yimou overturns some of the images of the family
planning program transmitted by the official media. Far from setting an example
for his neighbors, the village chief, the probable enforcer of the one-child policy in
his community, has five daughters. Rather than work hard to achieve the quotas of
the one-child policy and encourage the local leader to enforce them, peasant
woman Qiu Ju becomes a visible symbol of defiance of the quotas. Eight to nine
months pregnant, she crusades to and fro from village to town to district to city in
search of revenge for a threat to her ability to be impregnated by her husband and
bear more children.
On the eve of the twenty-first century, commercialization might appear to
jeopardize the role of media in the legal system of China by diluting the
authoritativeness of its messages, but the samples of state-run media transmissions
studied here support a different conclusion. They show that, despite the growth of
private media whose censored messages might contain official interpretations of
law, a variety of state-run media have strengthened their role in the PRC legal
system and sent messages that serve as sources of PRC law. If there has been a
trend in the relationship between media and law in China during the twentieth
century, it has been one where media have grown in their capacity to transmit the
law.
239. Huang Jianxin, Film Dir., Address at the Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, MN (Apr. 12,
1996) (on file with author).
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